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CATEGORICAL ONTOLOGY I
EXISTENCE
DARIO DENTAMARO AND FOSCO LOREGIAN
Abstract. The present paper is the first piece of a series whose aim is to develop an approach
to ontology and metaontology through category theory. We exploit the theory of elementary
toposes to claim that a satisfying “theory of existence”, and more at large ontology itself, can
both be obtained through category theory. In this perspective, an ontology is a mathematical
object: it is a category, the universe of discourse in which our mathematics (intended at large,
as a theory of knowledge) can be deployed. The internal language that all categories possess
prescribes the modes of existence for the objects of a fixed ontology/category.
This approach resembles, but is more general than, fuzzy logics, as most choices of E and
thus of ΩE yield nonclassical, many-valued logics.
Framed this way, ontology suddenly becomes more mathematical: a solid corpus of tech-
niques can be used to backup philosophical intuition with a useful, modular language, suitable
for a practical foundation. As both a test-bench for our theory, and a literary divertissement,
we propose a possible category-theoretic solution of Borges’ famous paradoxes of Tlo¨n’s “nine
copper coins”, and of other seemingly paradoxical construction in his literary work. We then
delve into the topic with some vistas on our future works.
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1. Introduction
El mundo, desgraciadamente, es real.
[Bor53]
This is the first piece of a series of works that will hopefully span through a certain amount of
time, and touch a pretty wide range of topics. Its purpose is to adopt a wide-ranging approach
to a fragment of elementary problems in a certain branch of contemporary philosophy. More
in detail, our work aims to lay a foundation of a few problems in ontology employing pure
mathematics; in particular, using the branch of mathematics known as category theory.
As authors, we are aware that such an ambitious statement of purpose must be adequately
motivated. This is the scope of the initial section of the present first manuscript.
1.1. What is this series. Since forever, mathematics studies three fundamental indefinite
terms: form, measure, and inference. Apperception makes us recognise that there are extended
entities in space, persisting in time. From this, the necessity to measure how much these entities
are extended, and to build a web of conceptual relations between them, explaining how they
arrange “logically”. Contamination between these three archetypal processes is certainly possible
and common; mathematics happens exactly at the crossroad where algebra, geometry and logic
intersect.
We can even say more: mathematics is a language; meta-mathematics that’s done through
mathematics (if such a thing even exists) exhibits the features of a ur-language, a generative
scheme for “all” possible languages. It is a language whose elements are the rules to give oneself
a language, conveying information, and allowing to perform a deduction. It is a meta-object: a
scheme to generate objects/languages.
Taken this tentative definition, mathematics (not its history, not its philosophy, but its prac-
tice) serves as a powerful tool to tackle the essential questions of ontology: what “things” are,
what makes them what they are and not different.
Quantitative thinking is a consistent (some would say “honest”) way of approaching this
deep problem, cogency of entities; yet, it is undeniable that a certain philosophical debate has
become hostile to mathematical language. A tear in the veil that occurred a long time ago,
due to different purposes and different specific vocabulary, can not be repaired by two people
only. If, however, the reader of these notes asks for an extended motivation for our work, a
wide-ranging project in which it fits, a long-term goal, in short, a program, they will find it
now: there is a piece of mathematics whose purpose is to solve philosophical problems, in the
same way, certain mathematics “solves” the motion of celestial bodies. It does not annihilate the
question: it proposes models within which one can reformulate it; it highlights what is a trivial
consequence of the axioms of that model and what instead is not, and requires the language
to expand, to be modified, sharpened. We aim to approach this never-mentioned discipline as
mathematicians.
Sure, solving once and for all the problems posited by ontology would be megalomaniac; we
do not claim such a thing. Instead, more modestly, we propose a starting point unhinging some
well-established beliefs (above all else, the idea that ontology is too general to be approached
CATEGORICAL ONTOLOGY I 3
quantitatively); we humbly point the finger at some problems that prose is unable to notice,
because it lacks a specific and technical language; we suggest that in such a language, when
words mean precise things and are tools of epistemic research instead of mere magic spells, a
few essential questions of recent ontology dissolve in a thread of smoke, and others simply become
“the wrong question”: not false, just meaningless as the endeavour to attribute a temperature
to consciousness or justice.
We shall say at the outset that such a language is not mathematics, but mathematics has an
enormous potential to hint at what the characteristica universalis should be made of.
It may seem suspicious to employ mathematics to tackle questions that traditionally pertain
to philosophy: in doing so, we believe we can provide a more adequate language, taken from
mathematics, within which to frame some deep ontological questions. The reader will allow a
tongue-in-cheek here: when coming to ontology, it is not a matter of making a correct use of
language, but rather to use the correct language.
This correct language is inherently mathematical, as only mathematics has the power to
substantiate an analysis in quantitative terms. This language is category theory, as only category
theory has the power to speak about a totality of structures of a given kind in a compelling way,
treating mathematical theories as mathematical objects.
As it is currently organised, our work will attempt to cover the following topics:
• the present manuscript, Existence, aims at providing a sufficiently expressive theory of
existence. Having a foundational roˆle, the scope of most of our remarks is, of course,
more wide-ranging and aimed at building the fundamentals of our toolset (mainly, cat-
egory theory and categorical logic, as developed in [MLM92, Joh77, LS88]). As both a
test-bench for our theory and a literary divertissement, we propose a category-theoretic
solution of Borges’ paradoxes present in [Bor44]. In our final section, we relate our
framework to more classical ancient and modern philosophers; we link topos theory to
Berkeley’s instantaneism and internal category theory to Quine’s definition of [domain
of] existence of an entity as a domain of quantifiers.
• A second chapter [DLa], currently in preparation, addresses the problem of identity,
and in particular its context-dependent nature. Our proof of concept here consists of
a solution to Black’s classical “two spheres” paradox [Bla52]; this time the solution is
provided by Klein’s famous Erlangen program group-theoretic devices. The two inter-
locutors of Black’s imaginary dialogue inhabit respectively Euclidean and affine worlds:
this affects their perception of the “two” spheres, and irredeemably prevents them from
mutual understanding.
• A third chapter [DLb], currently in preparation, addresses again the problem of iden-
tity, but this time through the lens of algebraic topology; in recent years homotopy
theory defied a well-established ontological assumptions such as the identity principle;
the many commonalities between category theory and homotopy theory suggest that
“identity” is not a primitive concept, but instead depends on our concrete representa-
tion of mathematical entities. When X,Y are objects in a category C, there is often a
class of “equivalences” W ⊆ hom(C) prescribing that X,Y shouldn’t be distinguished;
equality (better, some sort of homotopy equivalence) is then defined ex post in terms
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of W , changing as the ambient category C does; this yields a W -parametric notion of
identity ≡W , allowing categories to be categorified versions of Bishop sets, i.e. pairs
(S, ρ) where ρ is an equivalence relation on S prescribing a ρ-equality.
1.2. On our choice of meta-theory and foundation. During ’900 the direction of the
evolution of mathematics brought the discipline to divide into different sub-disciplines at first,
with their specific objects and languages, to then find unexpected unification under a single
notion, the notion of structure, using the formal tool that has best characterized the concept,
the categories. This process has spontaneously led to an epistemological revision of mathematics
and has inspired, in the development of operational tools, a revision of both its foundations and
its ontology. For many scholars is undeniable that
[the] mathematical uses of the tool CT and epistemological considerations having
CT as their object cannot be separated, neither historically nor philosophically.
[Kro¨07]
Structural-mathematical practice produced a "natural" ontology which, later, felt the need
to be characterized more precisely. Similarly to what Carnap 1 suggested regarding semantics,
mathematicians creating their discipline were not seeking to justify the con-
stitution of the objects studied by making assumptions as to their ontology.
[Kro¨07]
Beyond the attempts (ever those of Bourbaki group), what matters is that the habit of
reasoning in terms of structures has suggested implicit epistemological and ontological attitudes.
This matter would deserve an exhausting independent inquiry.
For our objectives it’s enough to declare a differentiation that Kro¨mer elaborated, inspired
by [Cor96]: the difference between structuralism and structural mathematics:
s) Structuralism: the philosophical position regarding structures as the subject matter of
mathematics
s) Structural Mathematics: the methodological approach to look in a given problem “for the
structure”
Remark 1.1. Of course, s implies s but the opposite is not always true.
That is, one can do structural mathematics without being a structuralist; that is, taking
different, or even opposite, positions concerning structuralism itself. That it has often come
1Some words that philosophers should keep in mind, on the lawfulness of the use of abstract entities (specifically
mathematical) in semantic reflection, also valid in ontology:
we take the position that the introduction of the new ways of speaking does not need any
theoretical justification because it does not imply any assertion of reality [...]. it is a practical,
not a theoretical question; it is the question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic
forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an
assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the
aim for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for the
decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of entities. [Car56]
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spontaneously to embrace this position in the theoretical reflection in the recent history of
mathematics is quite different (the "natural" ontology).
The use of CT as meta-language, despite the historical link with structuralism, doesn’t nev-
ertheless make automatic the transition from s to s, but suggests that the ontology is not only
dependent on "ideology" (in Quinean sense) of the theory, namely its expressive power, but is
influenced by the epistemological model inspired by the use of formal language itself.
The usefulness of Kro¨mer’s distinction, however, is another: instead of stumbling in a possibly
not ambiguous definition of structure (with the unwanted consequences that could arise in the
operational practice), the philosophy s can be reduced (or redefine) to the methodology s,
saying that:
structuralism is the claim that mathematics is essentially structural mathematics
[Kro¨07]
(the operative practice that "intervenes" in the definition of structuralism avoids the decade-
long debate of the humanities on these concepts).
This is the same thing as saying: the structural practice already is its philosophy.
Attempts to explain the term "structure" by Bourbaki in the years following the publication
of the Elements des Mathe´matiques, led to the first systematic elaboration of a philosophy that
we could appropriately call structural mathematics. Its target is to "assembling all possible ways
in which given set can be endowed with certain structure" [Kro¨07], and to do so elaborate, in the
programmatic paper The Architecture of Mathematics (written by Dieudonne´ alone), published
in 1950, a formal strategy. While specifying that "this definition is not sufficiently general
for the needs of mathematics" [Bou50], he encoded a series of operational steps through which
a structure on a collection is assembled set-theoretically. Adopting therefore a reductionist
perspective in which
the structureless sets are the raw material of structure building which in Bour-
baki’s analysis is “unearthed” in a quasi-archaeological, reverse manner; they are
the most general objects which can, in a rewriting from scratch of mathematics,
successively be endowed with ever more special and richer structures. [Kro¨07]
On balance, in Bourbaki’s structuralism, the notion of set doesn’t disappear definitively in
front of the notion of structure. The path towards an “integral” structuralism was still long.
In his influential paper [Law66] William Lawvere proposes a foundation of mathematics based
on category theory. To appreciate the depth and breadth of such an impressive piece of work,
however, the word “foundation” must be taken in the particular sense intended by mathemati-
cians:
[. . .] a single system of first-order axioms in which all usual mathematical objects
can be defined and all their usual properties proved.
Such a position sounds at the same time a bit cryptic to unravel, and unsatisfactory; Lawvere’s
(and others’) stance on the matter is that a foundation of mathematics is de facto just a set
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L of first-order axioms organised in a Gentzen-like deduction system. The deductive system so
generated reproduces mathematics as we know and practice it, i.e. provides a formalisation for
something that already exists and needs no further explanation, and that we call “mathematics”.
It is not a vacuous truth that L exists somewhere: the fact that the theory so determined
has a nontrivial model, i.e the fact that it can be interpreted inside a given familiar structure,
is both the key assumption we make, and the less relevant aspect of the construction itself;
showing that L “has a model” is –although slightly improperly– meant to ensure that, assuming
the existence of a naive set theory (i.e., assuming the prior existence of structures called “sets”),
axioms of L can be satisfied by a naive set. Alternatively, and more crudely: assuming the
existence of a model of ZFC, L has a model inside that model of ZFC.2
A series of works attempting to unhinge some aspects of ontology through category theory
should at least try to tackle such a simple and yet diabolic question as “where” are the symbols
forming the first-order theory of ETCC. And yet, everyone just believes in sets and solves the
issue of “where” they are with a leap of faith from which all else follows.
This might appear somewhat circular: aren’t sets in themselves already a mathematical
object? How can they be a piece of the theory they aim to be a foundation of? In his [Lol77]
the author addresses the problem as follows:
Quando un matematico parla di modelli non ha infatti l’impressione di uscire
dall’ambito insiemistico. Questa impressione, che e` corretta, e` giustificata dalla
possibilita` di rappresentare i linguaggi formali con gli oggetti della teoria degli
insiemire di studiare in essa le relazioni tra le strutture e le rappresentazioni dei
simboli. Quando l’attenzione e` rivolta ai modelli di una teoria degli insiemi, certe
questioni sofistiche non possono pero` essere piu` evitate. La domanda spontanea
sulla relazione che intercorre tra gli insiemi che sono modelli di una teoria e gli
insiemi di cui parla la teoria non e` altro che una domanda sulla relazione tra la
metateoria semantica insiemistica e la teoria in esame, o teoria oggetto. Le due
teorie possono coincidere, anzi la metateoria puo` essere anche una sottoteoria
propria della teoria oggetto. [. . .]
Si sceglie un insieme i cui elementi, di solito insiemi finiti, rappresentano i
simboli del linguaggio che si vuole studiare, quindi con una operazione di con-
catenazione che puo` essere la coppia ordinata si definisce l’insieme delle parole
L-delle formule ben formate, dei termini, l’operazione che a una formula associa
le sue variabili libere e cos`ı via per tutte le nozioni sintattiche. a
aAuthors’ translation:
2However, ensuring that a given theory has a model isn’t driven by psychological purposes only: on the one
hand, purely syntactic mathematics would be very difficult to parse, as opposed to the more colloquial practice
of mathematical development; on the other hand (and this is more important), the only things syntax can see
are equality and truth. To prove that a given statement is false, one either has to check all possible syntactic
derivations leading to ϕ, finding none –this is unpractical, to say the least– or to find a model where ¬ϕ holds.
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The idea that a subtheory L′ ⊂ L of the object theory can play the roˆle of metatheory might
appear baffling; in practice, the submodel doesn’t exactly play such roˆle: instead, there are two
possible solutions. Pure Platonism assumes the existence of a hierarchy of universes harbouring
the object theory; pure syntacticism exploits Go¨del’s completeness theorem: every proof is a
finite object, and every theorem proved in the metatheory is just a finite string of symbols. No
need for a model.
Platonism has limits: in a fixed a class theory C (MK, Morse-Mostowski; or NBG, Von
Neumann-Bernays-Go¨del), there’s an object V that plays the roˆle of the universe of sets; in V ,
all mathematics can be enacted. Of course, consistency of C is only granted by an act of faith.
Syntacticism has limits: following it, one abjures any universality mathematics might claim.
But syntacticism also has merits: undeniably (disgracefully, luckily) the World is real. And
reality is complex enough to contain languages as purely syntactical objects; the percussion of
a log with oxen bones, rather than prophecies over the entrails of a lamb, or intuitionistic type
theory, all have the same purpose: intersubjective convection of meaning, deduced by a bundle
of perceptions, so to gain an advantage, id est some predictive power, over them. Of course:
intuitionistic type theory is just slightly more effective than hepatomancy.
Knowledge is obtained by collision and retro-propagation between Reality and the perceptual
bundle it generates.
Accepting this, the urge to define seemingly abstract concepts like learning, conscience, and
knowledge, together with precious continuous feedback coming from real objects, evidently de-
termine an undeniable primacy of quantitative thinking, this time intended as machine learning
and artificial intelligence, that sets (or should set if only more philosophers knew linear algebra)
a new bar for research in philosophy of mind.
However, we refrain from entering such a deep rabbit-hole, as it would have catastrophic
consequences on the quality, length, and depth of our exposition.
The usual choice for mathematicians is to assume that, wherever and whatever they are, these
symbols “are”, and our roˆle in unveiling mathematics is descriptive rather than generative.3
This state of affairs has, to the best of our moderate knowledge on the subject, various
possible explanations:
• On one hand, it constitutes the heritage of Bourbaki’s authoritarian stance on formalism
in pure mathematics;
• on the other hand, a different position would result in barely any difference for the
“working-class”; mathematicians are irreducible pragmatists, somewhat blind to the con-
sequences of their philosophical stances.
So, symbols and letters do not exist outside of the Gentzen-like deductive system we specified
together with L.
3Inside constructivism, it is not legitimate to posit that axioms “create” mathematical objects; from this, the
legitimacy of the question of where they are, and the legitimate answer “nowhere”. The only thing we can say
is that they “make precise, albeit implicitly, the meaning of mathematical objects” [Aga12] (it seems to us that
in mathematics as well as in philosophy of language, meaning and denotation are safely kept separate). We take
this principle, and here we stop.
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As arid as it may seem, this perspective proved itself to be quite useful in working mathemat-
ics; consider for example the type declaration rules of a typed functional programming language:
such a concise declaration as
data Nat = Z | S Nat
makes no assumption on “what” Z and S:: Nat -> Nat are; instead, it treats these constructors
as meaningful formally (in terms of the admissible derivations a well-formed expression is subject
to) and intuitively (in terms of the fact that they model natural numbers: every data structure
that has those two constructors must be the type N of natural numbers).
Taken as an operative rule, this reveals exactly what is our stance towards foundations: we
are “structuralist in the metatheory”, meaning that we treat the symbols of a first-order theory
or the constructors of a type system regardless of their origin, provided the same relation occur
between criptomorphic collections of labelled atoms.
In this precise sense, we are thus structuralists in the metatheory, and yet we do so with a grain
of salt, maintaining a transparent approach to the consequences and limits of this partialisation.
On the one hand, pragmatism works; it generates rules of evaluation for the truth of sentences.
On the other hand, this sounds like a Munchhausen-like explanation of its the value, in terms
of itself. Yet there seems to be no way to do better: answering the initial question would give
no less than a foundation of language.
And this for no other reason than “our” metatheory is something near to a structuralist theory
of language; thus, a foundation for such a metatheory shall inhabit a meta-metatheory. . . and
so on.
Thus, rather than trying to revert this state of affairs we silently comply to it as everyone
else does; but we feel contempt after a brief and honest declaration of intents towards where
our metatheory lives. Such a metatheory hinges again on work of Lawvere, and especially on
the series of works on functorial semantics.
2. Categories as places
故有之以為利，無之以為用。
Laozi XI
The present section has double, complementary purposes: we would like to narrow the dis-
cussion down to the particular flavour in which we interpret the word “category”, but also to
expand its meaning to encompass its roˆle as a foundation for mathematics. More or less, the
idea is that a category is both an algebraic structure (a microcosm) and a metastructure in
which all other algebraic structures can be interpreted (a macrocosm).4
4As an aside, we shall at least mention the dangers of too much a naive approach towards the micro/macrocosm
dichotomy: if all algebraic structures can be interpreted in a category, and categories are algebraic structures,
there surely is such a thing as the theory of categories internal to a given one. And large categories shall be
thought as categories internal to the “meta-”category (unfortunate but unavoidable name) of categories. There
surely is a well-developed and expressive theory of internal categories (see [Bor94a, 8]); but our reader surely
has understood that the two “categories”, albeit bearing the same name, shall be considered on totally different
grounds: one merely is a structure; the other is a foundation for that, and others, structure.
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More in detail, a category provides with a sound graphical representation of the defining
operation of a certain type of structure T (see Definition 2.1 below; we take the word universal in
the sense of [Gri07, XV.1]). Such a perspective allows to concretely build an object representing
a given (fragment of) a language L, and a topos (see Definition A.2) obtained as a sort of
universal semantic interpretation of L as internal language. This construction is a classical
piece of categorical logic, and will not be recalled in detail (yet, see our Definition 4.1): the
reader is invited to consult [LS88, II.12, 13, 14], and in particular
J. Lambek proposed to use the free topos [on a type theory/language] as the
ambient world to do mathematics in; [. . .] Being syntactically constructed, but
universally determined, with higher-order intuitionistic type theory as internal
language, [Lambek] saw [this structure] as a reconciliation of the three classi-
cal schools of philosophy of mathematics, namely formalism, Platonism, and
intuitionism. [nLa20a]
Interpretation, as defined in logical semantics [Gam91], can be seen as a function t : L? → Ω
that associates elements of a set Ω to the free variables of a formula α in the language L?
generated by an alphabet L; along with the history of category theory, subsequent refinements
of this fundamental idea led to revolutionary notions as that of functorial semantics and internal
logic of a topos. As an aside, it shall be noted that the impulse towards this research was
somewhat motivated by the refusal of set-theoretic foundations, as opposed to type-theoretic
ones.
In the following subsection, we give a more fine-grained presentation of the philosophical
consequences that a “metatheoretical structural” perspective has on mathematical ontology.
2.1. Theories and their models. In [Law66] the author W. Lawvere builds a formal language
ETAC encompassing “elementary” category theory, and a theory ETCC for the category of all
categories, yielding a model for ETAC. In this perspective category theory has a syntax CT; in
CT, categories are terms. Besides, we are provided with a metatheory, in which we can consider
categories of categories, etc.:
If Φ is any theorem of the elementary theory of abstract categories, then ∀A(A |=
Φ) is a theorem of the basic theory of the category of all categories. [Law66]
After this, the author makes the rather ambiguous statement that “every object in a world
described by basic theory is, at least, a category”. This is a key observation: what is the world
described by ETAC, what are its elements?
We posit that the statement shall be interpreted as follows: categories in mathematics carry a
double nature. They surely are the structures in which the entities we are interested to describe
organise themselves; but on the other hand, they inhabit a single, big (meta)category of all
categories. Such a big structure is fixed once and for all, at the outset of our discussion, and it
is the place in which we can provide concrete models for “small” categories.
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In other words (and this is true also in light of our subsection A.3), categories live on different,
almost opposite, grounds: as syntactic objects, that can be used to model language, and as
semantic objects, that can be used to model meaning.
To fix ideas with a particular example: we posit that there surely is such a thing as “the
category of groups”. But on the other hand, groups are just very specific kinds of sets, so groups
are but a substructure of the only category that exists.
Sure, such an approach is quite unsatisfactory from a structural perspective. It bestows
the category of sets with a privileged role that it does not have: sets are just one of the
possible choices for a foundation of mathematics. Instead, we would like to disengage the
(purely syntactic) notion of structure from the (semantic) notion of interpretation.
The “categories as places” philosophy now provides such a disengagement, to approach the
foundation of mathematics agnostically.
In this perspective one can easily fit various research tracks in categorical algebra, [JPT04],
functorial semantics [Law63, HP07], categorical logic [LS88], and topos theory [Joh77] that
characterised the last sixty years of research in category theory.
Lawvere’s functorial semantics was introduced in the author’s PhD thesis [Law63] to provide
a categorical axiomatisation of universal algebra, the part of mathematical logic whose subject
is the abstract notion of mathematical structure: a semi-classical reference for universal algebra,
mingled with a structuralist perspective, is [Man12]; see also [SB81]. We shall say at the outset
that a more detailed and technical presentation of the basic ideas of functorial semantics is given
in our subsection A.3 below; here we aim neither at completeness nor self-containment.
Everything starts with the following definition:
Definition 2.1. A type T of universal algebra is a pair (T, α) where T is a set called the
(algebraic) signature of the theory, and α a function T → N that assigns to every element t : T
a natural number nt : N called the arity of the function symbol t.
Definition 2.2. A (universal) algebra of type T is a pair (A, fA) where A is a set and fA : T →∏
t:T Set(A
nt , A) is a function that sends every function symbol t : T to a function fAt : Ant → A;
fAt is called the nt-ary operation on A associated to the function symbol t : T .
We could evidently have replaces Set with another category C of our choice, provided the
object An : C still has a meaning for every n : N (to this end, it suffices that C has finite
products; we call such a C a Cartesian category). A universal algebra of type T in C is now a
pair (A, fA) where A : C and fA : T →∏t:T C(Ant , A); it is however possible to go even further,
enlarging the notion of “type of algebra” even more.
The abstract structure we are trying to classify is a sketch (the terminology is neither new
nor inexplicable: see [Ehr68, CL84, Bor94b]) representing the most general arrangement of
operations fA : An → A and properties thereof5 that coexist in an object A; such a sketch
is pictorially represented as a (rooted directed) graph, modeling arities of the various function
symbols determining a given type of algebra T (see also [Gri07, XV.3] for the definition of variety
of algebras).
5Examples of such properties are (left) alternativity: for all x, y, z, one has fA(x, fA(x, y)) = fA(fA(x, x), y);
associativity: fA(x, fA(y, z)) = fA(fA(x, y), z); commutativity: fA(x, y) = fA(y, x); and so on.
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Given the “theory” T and the graph GT that it represents, the category LT generated by
GT “is” the theory we aimed to study, and every functor A : LT → Set with the property that
A([n+m]) ∼= A[n]× A[m] concretely realises via its image a representation of LT (and thus of
T) in Set.
Remark 2.3. More concretely, there is a “theory of groups”. Such a theory determines a graph
GGrp built in such a way to generate a category L = LGrp with finite products. Models of the
theory of groups are functors L → Set uniquely determined by the image of the “generating
object” [1] (the set G = G[1] is the underlying set, or the carrier of the algebraic structure
in study; in our Definition 2.1 the carrier is just the first member of the pair (A, fA)); the
request that G is a product preserving functor entails that if L is a theory and G : L → Set
one of its models, we must have G[n] = Gn = G×G× · · · ×G, and thus each function symbol
f : [n] → [1] describing an abstract operation on G receives an interpretation as a concrete
function f : Gn → G.
Until now, we interpreted our theory L in sets; but we could have chosen a different category
C at no additional cost, provided C was endowed with finite products, to speak of the object
An = A × · · · × A for all n : N. In this fashion, we obtain the C-models of L, instead of its
Set-models: formally, and conceptually, the difference is all there.
Yet, the freedom to disengage language and meaning visibly has deep consequences: suddenly,
and quite miraculously, we are allowed to speak of groups internal to the category of sets,
i.e. functors LGrp → Set, topological groups, i.e. functors LGrp → Top (so multiplication and
inversion are continuous maps by this very choice, without additional requests); we can treat
monoids in the category of R-modules, i.e. R-algebras [Che57, IV], and monoids in the category
of posets (i.e. quantales [PR00]) all on the same conceptual ground.
It is evident that LT is the same in all our choices; all that changes is the semantic universe
in which the theory acquires meaning. This context-dependent definition of “structure” inspires
our stance towards ontology, as the reader will notice throughout our section 5 and section 6.
2.2. The roˆle of toposes. Among many different Cartesian categories in which we can inter-
pret a given theory L, toposes play a special roˆle; this is mostly because the internal language
every topos carries (in the sense of Definition 4.1) is quite expressive.
To every theory L one can associate a category, called the free topos E(L) on the theory
(see [LS88]), such that there is a natural bijection between the F-models of L, in the sense of
Remark 2.3, and (a suitable choice of) morphisms of toposes6 E(L)→ F :
Mod(L,F) ∼= hom(E(L),F).
In the present subsection we analyse how the construction of models of L behaves when the
semantics takes value in a category of presheaves (cf. [Bor94a, ??]).
Let’s start stating a plain tautology, that still works as blatant motivation for our interest in
toposes opposed as more general categories for our semantics. Sets can be canonically identified
6We refrain to enter the details of the definition of a morphism of toposes, but we glimpse at the definition:
given two toposes E,F a morphism (f∗, f∗) : E → F consists of a pair of adjoint functors (see [Bor94a, 3])
f∗ : E  F : f∗ with the property that f∗ commutes with finite limits (see [Bor94a, 2.8.2]).
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with the category [1,Set], so models of L are tautologically identified to its [1,Set]-models. It
is then quite natural to wonder what L-models become when the semantics is taken in more
general functor categories like [C,Set]. This generalisation is compelling to our discussion: if
C = I is a discrete category, we get back the well-known category of variable sets Set/I of
Proposition 3.1.
Now, it turns out that [C,Set]-model for an algebraic theory L, defined as functors L → [C,Set]
preserving finite products, correspond precisely to functors C → Set such that each FC is a L-
model: this gives rise to the following “commutative property” for semantic interpretation:
L-models in [C,Set] are precisely those models C → Set that take value in the
subcategory ModL(Set) of models for L. In other words we can “shift” the
Mod(−) construction in and out [C,Set] at our will:
ModL([C,Set]) ∼= [C,ModL(Set)]
As the reader can see, the procedure of interpreting a given “theory” inside an abstract
finitely complete category K is something that is only possible when the theory is interpreted as
a category, and when a model of the theory as a functor. This part of mathematics goes under
many names: the one we will employ, i.e. categorical, or functorial, semantics [Law63], but also
internalisation of structures, categorical algebra.
The internalisation paradigm sketched above suggests how “small” mathematicians often hap-
pily develop their mathematics without ever exiting a single (large) finitely complete category
K, without even suspecting the presence of models for their theories outside K. To a cate-
gory theorist, “groups” as abstract structures behave similarly to the disciples of the sect of the
Phoenix [Bor]: “the name by which they are known to the world is not the same as the one
they pronounce for themselves.” They are a different, deeper structure than the one intended
by their users.
By leaving the somewhat unsatisfying picture that “all categories are small” and by fixing
a semantic universe like Set), every large category works as a world in which one can speak
mathematical language (i.e. “study models for the theory of Ω-structures” as long as Ω is one
of our abstract theories).
So, categories truly exhibit a double nature: they are the theories we want to study, but they
also are the places where we want to realise those theories; looking from high enough, there is
plenty of other places where one can move, other than the category Set of sets and functions
(whose existence is, at the best of our knowledge, the consequence of a postulate; we similarly
posit that there exists a model for ETAC). Small categories model theories, they are syntax, in
that they describe a relational structure using compositionality; but large categories offer a way
to interpret the syntax, so they are a semantics. Our stance is that a large relational structure
is fixed once and for all, lying on the background, and allows for all other relational structures
to be interpreted.
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It is nearly impossible to underestimate the importance of this disengagement: syntax and
semantics, once separated and given a limited ground of action, acquire their meaning.7
More technically, in our Definition 4.1 we recall how this perspective allows interpreting
different kinds of logic in different kinds of categories: such an approach leads very far, to the
purported equivalence between different flavours of logics and different classes of categories;
the particular shape of semantics that you can interpret in K is but a reflection of K’s nice
categorical properties (e.g., having finite co/limits, nice choices of factorisation systems [Bor94a,
5.5], [FK72], a subobject classifier; or the property of the posets Sub(A) of subobjects of an object
A of being a complete, modular, distributive lattice. . . ).
In light of Definition 4.1, this last property has to do with the internal logic of the category:
propositions are the set, or rather the type, of “elements” for which they are “true”; and in nice
cases (like e.g. in toposes), they are also arrows with codomain a suitable type of truth values
Ω).
2.3. Categories are universes of discourse. Somehow, the previous section posits that cat-
egory theory as a whole is “bigger than the mathematics itself”, and it works as one of its
foundations; a category is a totality where all mathematics can be re-enacted; in this perspec-
tive, ETAC works as a metalanguage in which we develop our approach. This is not very far
from current mathematical practice, and in particular from Mac Lane’s point of view:
We can [. . .] “ordinary” mathematics as carried out exclusively within [a uni-
verse] U (i.e. on elements of U) while U itself and sets formed from U are to be
used for the construction of the desired large categories. [ML98, I.6]
since the unique large category we posit is “the universe”. But this approach goes further, as
it posits that mathematical theories are in themselves mathematical objects, and as such, subject
to the same analysis we perform on the object of which those theories speak about.
All in all, our main claim is that categories are of some use in clarifying a few philosophi-
cal problems, especially for what concerns ontology’s objects of discourse. The advantages of
this approach are already visible in mathematics; we are trying to export them in the current
philosophical debate.
Among many such advantages, we record those that are more influential to our work:
• Ontology can be approached with a problem-solving attitude: answers to ontological
problems are at least to some extent quantitatively determined; see our section 5 for a
roundup of examples in this direction.
• The possibility of reading theories in terms of relations allows to suspend ontological
commitment on the nature of objects. They are given, but embedded in a relational
structure; this relational structure, i.e. a category modelling the ontology in study, is the
object of our discourse. Even more: the two entities should not be considered as distinct:
an ontology is a category. This perspective is sketched in our section 6. This allows a
sharper, more precise, and less time-consuming conceptualisation process for ontology’s
7Of course, this is dialectical opposition at its pinnacle, and certainly not a sterile approach to category theory;
see [Law96] for a visionary account of how “dialectical philosophy can be modelled mathematically”.
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subjects of study; if ontology is regarded as (the internal language of) a category, it
becomes a context-dependent entity, i.e. a function of the relational structure in which
it is located.
• A weak form of structuralism, kept at an informal, metatheoretical level, is more than
enough to appreciate how objects interact between each other inside a theory and to
deduce how they should behave by just applying the basic constructions of elementary
mathematics coupled with category theory. To put it simply, the reader isn’t forced
to unconditionally adopt a hardcore-structuralist foundation such as e.g. structural
realism [Bai13, Eva16]; a similar attitude towards foundations is widespread in math-
ematical practice: many people do structural mathematics without even knowing, or
without worrying about, the subtleties of what a purely structuralist foundation im-
plies (Remark 1.1). And this for the simple reason that structural mathematics works:
structural theories are easier to grok, they are modular, resilient to change, concise.
Our main point is that the majority of, if not all, theories of existence seem burdened by
the impossibility to disentangle existence from a “context of existence”. Instead, the super-
exponential progress of mathematics along the XXth century can only be explained by the
general acceptance of the belief that things do not “exist” in themselves; instead, they do as long
as they are meaningful pieces of relational structures. Sure structuralism is a single philosophical
current among many: it is “the right one” since it profoundly reshaped mathematics (=the
prominent, most effective factory of epistemic knowledge humankind has ever produced).
In our system, ontology does not pose absolute questions: beings exist in a context, relative
to a relational structure (=a category) they are the objects of. Something is certainly lost: we
claim that what is lost is a complicated and confusing tangle of misunderstandings, caused by the
habit of confusing natural and formal language. A fortunate analogy still involves foundations
of Mathematics: bounding the existence of sets to a hierarchy of universes undoubtedly loses
something. But what is this something? How can it be probed? And then, in what sense it
“exists”?
As extremist as it may seem, our position fits into an already developed open debate; see for
example the work of J.P. Marquis:
[...] to be is to be related, and the “essence” of an “entity” is given by its relations
to its “environment”. [Mar97]
Sure, such a point of view is only acceptable when its fruitfulness has been determined by
clarifying and formalising the relationship between an ontology regarded as “all that there is”,
and a (large) category as “the place we inhabit (and in which we craft language)”. Our purpose
is to add a grain of sand to this fertile area of discussion.
As mentioned in our ?? these conceptual tools helped mathematical practice and has inad-
vertently inspired an epistemological and ontological quest about its objects of study. Someone
might object that we should first know what is a structure before working with it; Kro¨mer’s
reply seems particularly compelling:
CATEGORICAL ONTOLOGY I 15
this reproach is empty and one tries to explain the clearer by the more obscure
when giving priority to ontology in such situations [...]. Structure occurs in
dealing with something and does not exist independently of this dealing. [Kro¨07]
Category theory was invented without worrying about foundational issues; they were ad-
dressed just later. It effectively and faithfully involved all mathematics; we now claim struc-
turalism provides a “practical foundation” for metaphysical problems. For pragmatism and what
it means in category theory, see
that structural mathematics is characterized as an activity by treatment of
things as if one were dealing with structures. From the pragmatist viewpoint,
we do not know much more about structures than how to deal with them, after
all. [Kro¨07]
2.4. Existence: persistence of identity? Following Quine, ontology studies “what there is”;
it then appears natural to define at the outset the notion of existence.
Many approaches are possible to tackle this complicated and fundamental matter: in the
Fregean perspective [Fre79] ”x exists” if and only if ”x is identical to something [e.g., to itself]”,
whereas for Quine [Qui53] ”being is being the value of a [bounded] variable”.
The first approach is affine to conceptual realism, but it has scarce informative power (what is
equality? Frege defines existence through identity, an equally perilous concept, and even more,
this is not the right track: identity isn’t a thing; every identity is, in fact, an identification,
and every equality an equivalence relation –this isn’t far from the notion of Bishop set []). Of
course, turning this suggestion into a precise statement is complex enough a topic to dedicate
it a separate chapter of the present polyptych (in fact, two: [DLa, DLb]).
The second approach inspired the notion of ontological committment (the class of objects that
“we admit to exist” when we talk about ontology, or we participate in it) and the subsequent
definition of ontology (of a theory) as the domain of objects on which logical quantifiers vary
(cf. [Qui53]): each ontological theory is committed to the entities on which the quantifiers of
its statements vary.
We will see in subsection 6.3 that the Quinean conception fits in our categorical ontology
perspective as a consequence of a technical procedure called internalization of theories.
There is a third way, less common in literature but seemingly less questionable: define exis-
tence through persistence over time.
Let’s say that ”x exists” if and only if ”x is identical to itself in every time frame 〈T,<〉”,
where T is a non-empty set whose elements are instants and < a binary relation on T ; existence
is then a relation (x, t) 7→ x A t; “x exists in T ” if for every t : T we have x A t).
This definition captures well the intuitive notion of existence, relying on both identity (with
all the problems this might raise) and time, or rather an appropriate temporal logic ∗TL in
which entities “persist”. (For example, it’s easy to write down what the relationship “x exists in
T ” means in terms of linear temporal logic, LTL.)
One of the results of our work is that we can define existence in an equally intuitive way, but
without appealing neither to an identity principle nor to a time-frame; in fact providing a more
general concept within which others will also find themselves.
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We will phrase the question as follows: what is variable relative to x is the degree or strength
of its existence; “classical” existence is existence at the highest degree in the internal language
of the topos that plays the roˆle of the Universe (for us, a Borgesian universe); there we will be
able to indicate the strength of existence of objects, without assuming to move through instants
of time (as in the example of the nine copper coins of [Bor99b] might suggest, cf. Example 5.6)
or points in space (such as hro¨nir, cf. Example 5.13).
Depending on the structure of the domain, we can choose the logic that is most suited to the
context for the intuition we have of the universe in natural language.
Persistence over time is therefore not removed from the description, or denied; rather, it
becomes part of it.
Existence in this conception is nothing more than the mode of presence of the objects within
a relational model. It is therefore literally defined by what we can do with objects, how we can
fit them in a sensible web of relations.
This is not just an operational notion of existence, close to our common sense: things exist
if we can touch them, see them, indirectly measure them if invisible, based on interactions they
have with observable entities, describe them, count them, use them; and this is independent of
how they exist; rather, our possibility to probe them defines that they exist.
So, things exist since they belong to a category; based on our metatheoretical and foundational
choices, existence concerns how things relate to each other. Here is the advantage of categorical
thinking in a nutshell: to exploit structuralism to be able to bind not only our world but distant
realities such as Tlo¨n’s, which is but an example of an element in an ontology scheme.
Existence is context-dependent as it varies according to the internal language of the theo-
ry/category in which we operate. This allows to formalize the obvious and powerful intuition,
often belittled by ontologists, that existence on Tlo¨n will presumably be different from our own.
Changing ontology changes the concept of what is there and how it’s there; we believe our work
explicitly clarifies to what extent this happens, through mathematical language.
3. Preliminaries on variable set theory
a&yÄAdFEn Buumatra taAEn &yÄm@yAEn BArta ।
a&yÄEnDnAyv ta/ kA pErdvnA ॥ 28॥
S´r¯ımadbhagavadg¯ıta¯ II, 28
The present section introduces the main mathematical tool of our discussion: the theory
of variable sets. A variable set is just a family of sets indexed by another set I, i.e. (more
formally) a class function I → Set. The collection of all such functions forms the object class of
a category. Such categories are denoted as Set/I (read “sets over I”) and they are a particularly
rich framework to re-enact mathematics in its entirety; here we explore the structure of Set/I
in full detail.
We begin by assessing the equivalence between two different but equivalent descriptions of
the category of variable sets: as class functions I → Set, or as functions h : A → I with fixed
codomain I (cf. [Bor94a, 1.6.1]). In some of our proofs it will be crucial to blur such a distinction
between the category of functors I → Set and the slice category Set/I; once the following result
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is proved, we will freely refer to any of these two categories as the category of variable sets
(indexed by I).
Proposition 3.1. Let I be a set, regarded as a discrete category, and let SetI be the category
of functors F : I → Set; moreover, let Set/I the slice category. Then, there is an equivalence
(actually, an isomorphism when a coherent choice of coproduct has been made: see [Bor94a,
1.5.1]) between SetI and Set/I.
Proof. Our proof is based on the fact that we can represent the category SetI as the category
of I-indexed families of objects, i.e. with the category whose objects are (X)I := {Xi | i : I},
and morphisms (X)I → (Y )I the families {fi : Xi → Yi | i : I}. Given this, the two categories
obviously identify, as a functor F : I → Set amounts to a choice of sets Ai := F (i), and
functoriality reduces to the property that identity arrows in I are mapped to identity functions
Ai → Ai.
Let us consider an object h : X → I of Set/I, and define a function i 7→ h←(i); of course,
(X(h))I := {h←(i) | i : I} is a I-indexed family, and since I can be regarded as a discrete
category, this is sufficient to define a functor Fh : I → Set.
Let us define a functor in the opposite direction: let F : I → Set be a functor. This defines
a function hF :
∐
i:I Fi→ I, where
∐
i:I Fi is the disjoint union of all the sets Fi.
The claim now follows from the fact that the correspondences h 7→ Fh and F 7→ hF are
mutually inverse.
This is easy to verify: the function FhF sends i : I to the set h←F (i) = Fi, and the function
hFh : Set/I has domain
∐
i:I Fh(i) =
∐
i:I h
←(i) = X (as i runs over the set I, the disjoint union
of all preimages h←(i) equals the domain of h, i.e. the set X). 
Notation 3.2. The present remark is meant to establish a bit of terminology: by virtue of
Proposition 3.1 above, an object of the category of variable sets is equally denoted pair (A, f :
A → I), as a function h : I → Set, or as the family of sets {h(i) | i : I} = {Ai | i : I}. We call
the function f the structure map of the variable set A, and we call the function Fh the functor
associated, or corresponding, to the variable set in study. Common parlance almost always blurs
the distinction between these objects.
Remark 3.3. A more abstract look at this result establishes the equivalence Set/I ∼= SetI as a
particular instance of the Grothendieck construction (see [Lei04, 1.1]): for every small category
C, the category of functors C → Set is equivalent to the category of discrete fibrations on C (see
[Lei04, 1.1]). In this case, the domain C = I is a discrete category, hence all functors E → I are,
trivially, discrete fibrations.
Remark 3.4. The next crucial step of our analysis is the observation that the category of
variable sets is a topos: we break the result into the verification of the various axioms, as
exposed in Definition A.2 and Definition A.3. Our proof relies on the fact that the category of
sets is itself a topos: in particular, it is cartesian closed, and admits the set {⊥,>} as subobject
classifier.8
8We choose to employ a classical model of set theory, as opposed to an intuitionistic model where the classifier Ω
consists of a more general Heyting algebra H; a general procedure to obtain a Ω-many valued logic of set theory
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Proposition 3.5. The category of variable sets is Cartesian closed in the sense of [Bor94a,
p.335].
Proof. We shall first show that the category of variable sets admits products: this is well-known
as in Set/I, products are precisely pullbacks ([Bor94a, 2.5.1]); note that Proposition 3.1 gives
an identification between the pullback X ×I Y as a set over I, and the I-indexed family of the
preimages of i under h:
X ×I Y
h


X
f 
Y
g
I
⇐⇒ i 7→ h←(i) =
{
(x, y) : X ×I Y | h(x, y) = i
}
Now, this yields a canonical bijection h←(i) ∼= f←(i) × g←(i). This is exactly the definition of
the product of the two associated functors Ff , Fg : I → Set.
To complete the proof, we shall show that each functor ×I Y has a right adjoint Y tI .
The functor SetI → SetI : Z 7→ Y tI Z where Y tI Z : i 7→ Set(Yi, Zi) does the job. This,
together with a straightforward verification, sets up the bijection
X ×I Y // Z
X // Y tI Z
and by a completely analogous argument (the construction (A,B) 7→ A ×I B is of course
symmetric in its two arguments), we get a bijection
X ×I Y // Z
Y // X tI Z;
showing that also X×I has a right adjoint X tI . This concludes the proof that the category
of variable sets is Cartesian closed. 
Proposition 3.6. The category of variable sets has a subobject classifier.
Proof. From Definition A.2 we know that we shall find a variable set Ω such that there is a
bijection
χ : A // Ω
SubI(A)
is to take the topos E = Sh(H) of sheaves on a Heyting algebra H: then, there is an isomorphism ΩE ∼= H.
The core of all our argument is very rarely affected by the choice to cut the complexity of our Ω to be the bare
minimum; this is mainly due to expository reasons. The reader shall feel free to replace {⊥,>} with a more
generic choice of Heyting algebra, and they are invited to adapt the arguments of section section 5 accordingly.
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where SubI(A) denotes the set of isomorphism classes of monomorphisms into A, in the category
of variable sets.9 For the sake of simplicity, for the rest of the proof we fix as category of variable
sets the slice Set/I.
From this we make the following guess: as an object of Set/I, Ω is the canonical projection
piI : I×{⊥,>} → I. We are thus left with the verification that piI has the correct structure and
universal property.
First, we shall find a universal monomorphism t : ∗ → Ω in Set/I. Unwinding the definitions
(in particular, since the identity function idI : I → I is evidently the terminal object in Set/I),
such a map amounts to an injective function I → Ω having the projection piI : Ω× I → I as left
inverse.
It turns out that the function I → I × {⊥,>} choosing the top-level copy of I ∼= I × {>}
plays the roˆle of t: in the following, we shortly denote ΩI such a product set.
Now, a monomorphism
[
S
s↓
I
]
↪→
[
A
a↓
I
]
in Set/I is given by an injective function S ↪→ A that
commutes with the structure maps of S,A; so, the commutative square
S

// I
t

A
χS
// ΩI
is easily seen to be a pullback; in fact, every morphism of variable sets χS : A→ ΩI must send
the element a : A to a pair (i, ) : I×{⊥,>}. The pullback of χ and t, as defined above, consists
of the subset of the product A × I such that χ(a) = t(i) = (i,>); this defines a variable set
S = (χ(i,>))I , and such a correspondence is clearly invertible: every variable set arises in this
way, and defines a “characteristic” function χS : (A,
[
A
f ↓
I
]
)→ (ΩI , piI):
χS(a) =
{
(f(a),>) if a : S
(f(a),⊥) if a : Ar S
This concludes the proof of the fact that Set/I admits a subobject classifier. 
Remark 3.7. A straightforward but important remark is now in order. The structure of
subobject classifier of ΩI , and in particular the shape of a characteristic function χS : A→ ΩI
for a subobject S ⊆ A in Set/I, is explicitly obtained using the structure map f of the variable
set f : A→ I.
This will turn out to be very useful along our main section, where we shall note that a
proposition in the internal language of Set/I amounts to a function p : U → ΩI , having as
9A monomorphism into A as an object of SetI is nothing but a family of injections si : Si → Ai; a monomorphism
in Set/I is a set S in a commutative triangle
S //
s 
A
a
I.
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domain a variable set u : U → I, whose structure map uniquely determines the “strength” (see
Remark 5.1) of the proposition p. In a nutshell, p(x) is a truth value in ΩI ; the fact that p is a
morphism of variable sets however forces this truth value to be (u(x), ) : I ×{⊥,>}. We invite
the baffled reader not to worry now; we will duly justify each of these conceptual steps along
section 5.
Proposition 3.8. The category of variable sets is cocomplete and accessible.
Proof. Cocompleteness can be shown appealing to [Bor94a, ??]: if C is a small category, and D
a cocomplete category, the category DC of all functors F : C → D is cocomplete, and colimits
are computed pointwise, meaning that given a diagram J → DC of functors Fj , colimFj : DC
is the functor C 7→ colimJ Fj(C) (that exists in D by assumption). Given that Set/I ∼= SetI ,
and that the category Set is cocomplete, we obtain the result.
Accessibility is a corollary of Yoneda in the following form: every F : I → Set is a colimit of
representables
F ∼= colim
(
E(F ) Σ−→ I y−→ SetI
)
(the category of elements [Bor94a] E(F ) of F : SetI is small because in this case E(F ) ∼=∐
i:I Fi). 
Corollary 3.9. The category of variable sets is a Grothendieck topos.
4. The internal language of variable sets
I am hard but I am fair; there is no racial bigotry here. [. . .]
Here you are all equally worthless.
GySgt Hartman
Definition 4.1. The internal language of a topos E is a formal language defined by types and
terms; suitable terms form the class of variables. Other terms form the class of formulæ.
• Types are the objects of E
• Terms of type X are morphisms of codomain X, usually denoted α, β, σ, τ : U → X.
– Suitable terms are variables: the identity arrow of X ∈ E is the variable x : X → X.
For technical reasons we shall keep a countable number of variables of the same
type distinguished:10 x, x′, x′′, · · · : X → X are all interpreted as 1X .
• Generic terms may depend on multiple variables; the domain of a term of type X is the
domain of definition of a term.
A number of inductive clauses define the other terms of the language:
• the identity arrow of an object X ∈ E is a term of type X;
10These technical reasons lie on the evident necessity to be free to refer to the same free variable an unbounded
number of times. This can be formalised in various ways: we refer the reader to [LS88] and [Joh77].
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• given terms σ : U → X and τ : V → Y there exists a term 〈σ, τ〉 of type X×Y obtained
from the pullback
W

//
〈σ,τ〉
%%
X × V

U × Y // X × Y
• Given terms σ : U → X, τ : V → X of the same type X, there is a term [σ = τ ] :
W
〈σ,τ〉−−−→ X ×X δX−−→ Ω, where δX : X ×X → Ω is defined as the classifying map of the
mono X ↪→ X ×X.
• Given a term σ : U → X and a term f : X → Y , there is a term f [σ] := f ◦ σ : U → Y .
• Given terms θ : V → Y X and σ : U → X, there is a term
W 〈θ, σ〉 −→ Y X ×X ev−→ Y
• In the particular case Y = Ω, the term above is denoted
[σ ∈ θ] : W 〈θ, σ〉 → Ω
• If x is a variable of type X, and σ : X × U → Z, there is a term
λx.σ : U
η−→ (X × U)X σ
X
−−→ ZX
obtained as the mate of σ.
These rules can of course be also presented as the formation rules for a Gentzen-like deductive
system: let us rewrite them in this formalism.
1X : X → X
σ : U → X τ : V → Y
〈σ, τ〉 : W 〈θ, σ〉 → X × Y
σ : U → X τ : V → X
[σ = τ ] : W → Ω
σ : U → X f : X → Y
f [σ] : U → Y
θ : V → Y X σ : U → X
W 〈θ, σ〉 −→ Y X ×X ev−→ Y
x : X σ : X × U → Z
λx.σ = σX ◦ η : U → (X × U)X → ZX
To formulas of the language of E we apply the usual operations and rules of first-order logic:
logical connectives are induced by the structure of internal Heyting algebra of Ω: given formulas
ϕ,ψ we define
• ϕ ∨ ψ is the formula W 〈ϕ,ψ〉 → Ω× Ω ∨−→ Ω;
• ϕ ∧ ψ is the formula W 〈ϕ,ψ〉 → Ω× Ω ∧−→ Ω;
• ϕ⇒ ψ is the formula W 〈ϕ,ψ〉 → Ω× Ω ⇒−→ Ω;
• ¬ϕ is the formula U → Ω ¬−→ Ω.
Universal quantifiers admit an interpretation in the Mitchell-Be´nabou language of E : the
following definition comes from [MLM92, VI].
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Definition 4.2. Let E be a topos, and let ϕ : U × V → Ω be a formula defined on a product
type U × V . The variable u : U can be now quantified over yielding a new formula
∀u.ϕ(u, v) : V → Ω
which no longer contains u as a free variable.
The term ∀u.ϕ(u, v) is obtained by composition of λu.ϕ(u, v) : V → V → ΩU with the unique
right adjoint ∀t : ΩU → Ω to the precomposition t∗ : Ω→ ΩU 11 in the diagram
V
λu.ϕ // ΩU
∀t // Ω
(see [MLM92, IV.9]). Similarly, we obtain a term ∃u.ϕ(u, v) from the composition
V
λu.ϕ // ΩU
∃t // Ω
with the left adjoint ∃t a t.
Each formula ϕ : U → Ω defines a subobject {x | ϕ} ⊆ U of its domain of definition; this is
the subobject classified by ϕ, and must be thought as the subobject where “ϕ is true”.
If ϕ : U → Ω is a formula, we say that ϕ is universally valid if {x | ϕ} ∼= U . If ϕ is universally
valid in E , we write “E  ϕ” (read: “E believes in ϕ”).
Examples of universally valid formulas:
• E  [x = x]
• E  [(x ∈X {x | ϕ}) ⇐⇒ ϕ]
• E  ϕ if and only if E  ∀x.ϕ
• E  [ϕ⇒ ¬¬ϕ]
Let us now glance at the internal language of variable sets. This will turn out to be the
cornerstone for the analysis in section 5.
Here we just unwind Definition 4.1 at its very surface; we invite the reader to endeavour in
the instructive exercise to fill all details properly.
Definition 4.3. Types and terms of L(Set/I) are respectively arrows
[
U
↓
I
]
with codomain I,
and commutative triangles
U
σ //
u

X
x

I
Given this, we define
• product terms as functions σ : U1 ×I U2 ×I · · · ×I Un → X;
11The arrow t : U → 1 is the terminal map, and t∗ : Ω1 → ΩU is induced by precomposition; it sends a term
x : Ω to the constant function t∗x = λu.x.
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• terms 〈σ, τ〉 obtained as the (diagonal map in the) pullback
W 〈σ, τ〉

// X ×I V


U ×I Y //
//
X ×I Y
&&
I ×I I ∼= I
• terms [σ = τ ], obtained as compositions
W 〈σ, τ〉 〈σ,τ〉 // X ×I Y δX // ΩI
where δX : X×I X → Ω classifies the mono m : X → X×I X obtained by the universal
property of the pullback X ×I X as the kernel pair of
[
X
x ↓
I
]
.
The cartesian closed structure of Set/I (cf. Proposition 3.5) yields terms (we denote BA := A t
B in the notation of Proposition 3.5)
• [σ ∈ θ] : W 〈θ, σ〉 → Y X ×I X → ΩI from suitable σ, θ;
• U → (X ×I U)X σ
X
−−→ ZX (λ-abstraction on x : X) from a suitable σ : X ×I U → Z.
Quantifiers can be deduced in a similar way, starting from their general definition in Defini-
tion 4.2.
Remark 4.4. Like every other Grothendieck topos, the category Set/I has a natural number
object (see [MLM92, VI.1], [LS88, p.46]); here we shall outline its construction. It is a general
fact that such a natural number object in the category of variable sets, consists of the constant
functor on N : Set, when we realise variable sets as functors I → Set: thus, in fibered terms, the
natural number object is just piI : N× I → I.
A natural number object provides the category E it lives in with a notion of recursion and
with a notion of E-induction principle: namely, we can interpret the sentence(
Q0 ∧∧i≤nQi⇒ Q(i+ 1))⇒ ∧n:NQn
for every Q : N→ ΩI .
In the category of variable sets, the universal property of piI : N × I → I amounts to the
following fact: given any diagram of solid arrows
(4.1)
I
0 // N× I
u

s×I // N× I
u

I
x
// X
f
// X
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where every arrow carry a structure of morphism over I (and 0 : i 7→ (0, i), s × I : (n, i) 7→
(n + 1, i)), there is a unique way to complete it with the dotted arrow, i.e. with a function
u : N× I → X such that
u ◦ (s× I) = f ◦ u.
Clearly, umust be defined by induction: if it exists, the commutativity of the left square amounts
to the request that u(0, i) = x(i) for every i : I. Given this, the inductive step is
u(s(n, i)) = u(n+ 1, i) = f(u(n, i)).
This recursively defines a function with the desired properties; it is clear that these requests
uniquely determine u.
Such a terse exposition does not exhaust such a vast topic as recursion theory conducted
with category-theoretic tools. The interested reader shall consult [JR97] for a crystal-clear
introductory account, and [CH08, CH14] for more recent and modern development of recursion
theory.
The object of natural numbers of Set/I is easily seen to match the definition of the initial
object [Bor94a] of the category Dyn/I so defined:
• the objects of Dyn/I are dynamical systems in Set/I, i.e. the triples (x,X, f), where
X : Set/I (say, with structure map ξ : X → I), x : (I, idI) → (X, ξ) and f : X → X is
an endo-morphism of variable sets;
• given two dynamical systems (x,X, f) and (y, Y, g) a morphism between them is a
function u : X → Y such that the diagram in (4.1) commutes in all its parts.
The reason why such a triple (x,X, f) identifies as a (discrete) dynamical system is easily seen:
the function x : I → X works as initial seed for a recursive application of f , in such a way that
every f : X → X defines a sequence
un+1 := f(un)
of its iterates. The system now lends itself to all sorts of questions: is there a fixed point for
un(x)? Does the limit of un(x) belong toX (not obvious: considerX = [0, 1[ and un(x) ≡ 1− 1n )?
Is un(x) continuous in x? Etc.
5. Nine copper coins, and other toposes
Explicaron que una cosa es igualdad, y otra identidad, y
formularon una especie de reductio ad absurdum, o sea el caso
hipote´tico de nueve hombres que en nueve sucesivas noches
padecen un vivo dolor. ¿No ser´ıa rid´ıculo -interrogaron-
pretender que ese dolor es el mismo?
JLB —Tlo¨n, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius
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5.1. Choosing an internal logic. According to our description of the Mitchell-Be´nabou lan-
guage in the category of variable sets, propositions are morphisms of the form
p : U → ΩI
where ΩI is the subobject classifier of Set/I described in Proposition 3.6; now, recall that
• the object ΩI = {0, 1} × I → I becomes an object of Set/I when endowed with the
projection piI : ΩI → I on the second factor of its domain;
• the universal monic t : I → ΩI consists of a section of piI , precisely the one that sends
i : I to the pair (i, 1) : ΩI ;
• every subobject U ↪→ A of an object A results as a pullback (in Set/I) along t:
U
u

u //
m

I
t

I
A
@@
χU
// ΩI
``
(see Proposition 3.6 for a complete proof)
The set I in this context acts as a multiplier of truth values, in that every proposition can have
a pair (, i) as truth value. We introduce the following notation: a proposition p : U → ΩI is
true, in context x : U , with strength t, if p(x) = (1, t) (resp., p(x) = (0, t)).
Remark 5.1. A proposition in the internal language of variable sets is a morphism of the
following kind: a function p : U → ΩI , defined on a certain domain, and such that
U
u

p // {0, 1} × I
piI

I I
(it must be a morphism of variable sets!) This means that pip(x : U) = u(x : U), so that
p(x) = (x, u(x)) for x = 0, 1 and u is uniquely determined by the "variable domain" U . This is
an important observation: the strength with which p is true/false is completely determined by
the structure of its domain, in the form of the function u : U → I that renders the pair (U, u)
an object of Set/I.
Remark 5.2. To get a grip of the different roles of various classes of propositions, and given
that our interest will be limited to a certain class of particular propositions that we will construct
ex nihilo, it is now convenient to discuss what constraints we have to put on the structure of
I: of course, the richest this structure is, the better will the category Set/I behave: it is for
example possible to equip I with an order structure, or a natural topology. Among different
choices of truth multiplier, yielding different categories of variable sets, and different kinds of
internal logic therein, we will privilege those that make I behave like a space of strengths: a
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dense, linear order with LUP, thus not really far from being a closed, bounded subset of the real
line.12
The main result of the present section is a roundup of examples showing that it is possible to
concoct categories of variable sets where some seemingly paradoxical constructions coming from
J.L. Borges’ literary world have, instead, a perfectly “classical” behaviour when looked with the
lenses of the logic of variable set theory.
Each of the examples in our roundup Example 5.6, 5.12, 5.13 is organised as follows: we recall
the shape of a paradoxical statement in Borges’ literary world. Then, we show in which topos
this reduces to an intuitive statement expressed in the syntax of a variable set category.
More than often, we use I = [0, 1] as our base for variable sets; as already said, there are
different reasons for this choice: the most intuitive is that if a truth value is given with a strength
t : I it is a natural request to be able to compare elements in this set; in particular, it should
always be possible to assess what truth value is stronger.
For this reason, even if this assumption is never strictly necessary (the only constraint is that
I is totally, or partially, ordered set by a relation ≤), a natural choice for I is a continuum (=a
dense total order with LUP –see [Mos09]). An alternative choice drops the density assumption:
in that case the (unique) finite total order ∆[n] = {0 < 1 < · · · < n}, or the countable total
order I = ω =
⋃
n ∆[n] are all pretty natural choices for I (although it is way more natural for
I to have a minimum and a maximum element).13
Remark 5.3. In each of these cases “classical” logic is recovered as a projection: propositions
p can be true or false with strength 1,14 the maximum element of I:
{⊥,>}
0 1
0 1
{>} × I
{⊥} × I
In order to aid the reader understand the explicit way in which I “multiplies” truth values, we
spell out explicitly the structure of the subobject classifier in Set/∆[2]. In order to keep calling
the minimum and maximum of I respectively 0 and 1 we call 12 the intermediate point of ∆[2].
12There is another more philosophical reason for this assumption, that will appear clear throughout the section:
density of I is meant to allow intersubjective concordance between two interlocutors X and Y . When forced
in a debate on existence of the coins, they might diagree about the degree of existence of some of them; the
assumption that I is a dense order makes it possible to always find an intermediate strength between the one
pX , assigned by X, and the one pY assigned by Y to the same set of coins, as there must be a third truth value
z lying between the two.
13We’re only interested in the notion of an abstract interval here: a continuum X endowed with an operation
X → X∨X of “zooming”, uniquely defined by this property. In a famous paper Freyd characterises “the interval”
as the terminal interval coalgebra: see [Fre08, §1]; for our purposes, note that [0, 1] is a natural choice: it is a
frame, thus a Heyting algebra H = ([0, 1],∧,∨,⇒) with respect to the pseudo-complement operation given by
(x⇒ z) := ∨x∧y≤z y (it is immediate that x ∧ a ≤ b if and only if a ≤ x⇒ b for every a, b : [0, 1]).
14Here I is represented as an interval whose minimal and maximal element are respectively 0 and 1; of course
these are just placeholders, but it is harmless for the reader to visualise I as the interval [0, 1].
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Remark 5.4. The subobject classifier of Set/∆[2] consists of the partially ordered set ∆[1]×∆[2]
that we can represent pictorially as a rectangle
(0, 0)
(0, 1)
( 1
2
, 0)
( 1
2
, 1)
(0, 0)
(0, 1)
endowed with the product order. The resulting poset is partially ordered, and in fact a Heyting
algebra, because it results as the product of two Heyting algebras: the Boole algebra {0 < 1} and
the frame of open subsets of the Sierpinski space {a, b} (the topology is τS = {∅, {a}, {a, b}}).
Remark 5.5. Given that I = [0, 1] endowed with its usual Euclidean topology is one of our
most natural choices, we explicitly define some interesting sets obtained out of ΩI or out of a
given proposition p : U → ΩI in the Mitchell-Be´nabou language of Set/[0, 1]:
• A> = {x : U | p(x) = (>, tx), tx > 0} = p←({>} × (0, 1]) e A⊥ = {x : U | p(x) =
(⊥, tx), tx > 0}; this set canonically identifies to the subset of structure functions
[
U
u↓
I
]
such that u←0 = ∅.
• Similarly, we define Z> = p←({>} × [0, 1)) and its companion Z⊥.
• B> = {x : U | p(x) = (>, 1)} = p←((>, 1)) and B⊥ = {x : U | p(x) = (⊥, 1)} “true”s
and “false”s; these are obtained as fibers over the maximal element of I.
• E>t = {x : U | p(x) = (1, t)} e E⊥t = {x : U | p(x) = (0, t)}.
A crucial decision at some point will be about the regularity with which the strength of
p depends with respect to the variables on its domain of definition. Without a continuous
dependence, small changes in context x : U might drastically change the truth value p(x).15
5.2. The unimaginable topos theory hidden in Borges’ library. Jorge Luis Borges’
literary work is well-known to host paradoxical worlds; oftentimes, seemingly absurd conse-
quences follow by stretching ideas from logic and mathematics to their limits: time, infinity,
self-referentiality, duplication, recursion, the relativity of time, the illusory nature of our per-
ceptions, eternity as a curse, the limits of language, and its capacity to generate worlds.
In the present section, we choose Fictions, Borges’ famous collection of novels, as a source of
inspiration for possible and impossible worlds and their ontology.
Borges’ work generates “impossible worlds”: the term as it is is used in various ways in
paraconsistent semantics since the classic work of Rescher and Brandom [RB82], where worlds
are obtained starting from “possible” ones, through recursive operations on standard Kripkean
worlds.
15There is no a priori reason to maintain that p is a continuous proposition; one might argue that discontinuous
changes in truth value of p happen all the time in “real life”; see the family of paradoxes based on so-called
separating instants: how well-defined the notion of “time of death” is? How well-defined the notion of “instant
in time”?
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Here we claim that interesting consequences stem from reversing this perspective: instead of
removing from the realm of possibility those worlds that do not comply with sensory experience
tagging them as “impossible”, we accept their existence, for bizarre that it may seem, and we
try to deduce from their very existence a kind of logic that can consistently generate them.
The results of our analysis are surprising:
• we unravel how a mathematically deep universe Borges has inadvertently created: of the
many compromises we had to take in order to reconcile literature and the underlying
mathematics,16 we believe no one is particularly far-fetched one;
• we unravel how relative ontological assumptions are; they are not given: using category
theory, ontology, far from being the presupposition on which it is based, is a byproduct
of language itself. The more expressive language is, the more ontology becomes; the
fuzzier its capacity to assert truth, the fuzzier existence becomes;
• “Fuzziness” of existence, i.e. the fact entia exist less than completely, is hard-coded in
the language (in the sense of Definition 4.1) of the category we decide to work in from
time to time;
To sum up, readers willing to find an original result in this paper might find it precisely here: we
underline how Borges’ alternative worlds (Babylon, Tlo¨n dots) are mathematically consistent
places, worthy of existence as much as our world, just based on a different internal logic. And
they are so just thanks to a base-sensitive theory of existence –ontology breaks in a spectrum
of ontologies, one for each category/world.
The first paradox we aim to frame in the right topos is the famous nine copper coins argument,
used by the philosophers of Tlo¨n to construct a paradoxical object whose existence persists over
time, in absence of a consciousness continually perceiving it and maintaining in a state of being.
Example 5.6 (Nine copper coins). First, we recall the exact statement of the paradox:17
El martes, X atraviesa un camino desierto y pierde nueve monedas de cobre.
El jueves, Y encuentra en el camino cuatro monedas, algo herrumbradas por
la lluvia del mie´rcoles. El viernes, Z descubre tres monedas en el camino. El
viernes de man˜ana, X encuentra dos monedas en el corredor de su casa. El
16See Remark 5.7 below: these compromises mainly amount to assumptions on the behaviour of space-time on
Tlo¨n and Babylon.
17The paradox appears in a primitive, mostly unchanged version in [Bor97], where instead of nine copper coins, a
single arrow, shot by an anonymous archer, disappears among the woods. For what concerns Tlo¨n’s nine copper
coins, our translation comes from [Bor99b]:
Tuesday, X crosses a deserted road and loses nine copper coins. On Thursday, Y finds in the
road four coins, somewhat rusted by Wednesday’s rain. On Friday, Z discovers three coins on
the road. On Friday morning, X finds two coins in the corridor of his house. The heresiarch
would deduce from this story the reality - i.e., the continuity - of the nine coins which were
recovered.
It is absurd (he affirmed) to imagine that four of the coins have not existed between Tuesday
and Thursday, three between Tuesday and Friday afternoon, two between Tuesday and Friday
morning. It is logical to think that they have existed - at least in some secret way, hidden
from the comprehension of men - at every moment of those three periods.
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quer´ıa deducir de esa historia la realidad -id est la continuidad- de las nueve
monedas recuperadas.
Es absurdo (afirmaba) imaginar que cuatro de las monedas no han existido
entre el martes y el jueves, tres entre el martes y la tarde del viernes, dos entre el
martes y la madrugada del viernes. Es lo´gico pensar que han existido -siquiera
de algu´n modo secreto, de comprensio´n vedada a los hombres- en todos los
momentos de esos tres plazos.
Before going on with our analysis, it is important to remark that there is one and only one
reason why the paradox of the nine copper coins is invalid: copper does not rust. Incidentally,
we will be able to propose a rectification of this “rust counterargument” without appealing to
the assumption that copper can rust on Tlo¨n due to a purported difference between Earth’s and
Tlo¨nian chemistry.
It is obvious on what this construction leverages to build an efficient aporia: the unimaginable
persistence of things through time, even without a perceivent consciousness.
Expressed in natural language, our solution to the paradox goes more or less as follows: X
loses their coins on Tuesday, and the strength ϕ with which they “exist” lowers; it grows back in
the following days, going back to a maximum value when X retrieves two of their coins on the
front door. Y finding of other coins raises their existence strength to a maximum. The coins
that Y has found rusted (or rather, the surface copper oxidized: this is possible, but water is
rarely sufficient to ignite the process alone –certainly not in the space of a few hours.
Remark 5.7. In this perspective, Tlo¨n classifier of truth values can be taken as ΩI = {0 <
1} × I, where I is any set with more than one element; a minimal example can be I = {N,S}
(justifying this choice from inside Tlo¨n is easy: the planet is subdivided into two hemispheres;
each of which now has its own logic “line” independent from the other), but as explained in
Remark 5.7 a more natural choice for our purposes is the closed real interval I = [0, 1].
This allows for a continuum of possible forces with which a truth value can be true or false;
it is to be noted that [0, 1] is also the most natural place on which to interpret fuzzy logic,
albeit the interest for [0, 1] therein can be easily and better motivated starting from probability
theory. (There are interesting perspective on how to develop basic measure theory out of [0, 1].
For example, measures valued in things like Banach space and more general topological vector
spaces have been considered.)
We now start to formalise properly what we said until now. To set our basic assumptions
straight, we proceed as follows:
• Without loss of generality, we can assume the set C = {c1, . . . , c9} of the nine coins
to be totally ordered and partitioned in such a way that the first two coins are those
retrieved by X on Tuesday, the subsequent four are those found by Y on their way, and
the other three are those seen byZ. So,
C = CX unionsq CY unionsq CZ .
and CX = {cX1, cX2}, CY = {cY 1, cY 2, cY 3, cY 4}, CZ = {cZ1, cZ2, cZ3} As already said,
the truth multiplier I is the closed interval [0, 1] with its canonical order –so with its
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canonical structure of Heyting algebra, and if needed, endowed with the usual topology
inherited by the real line.
• Propositions of interest for us are of the following form:
λgcd.p(g, c, d) : {X,Y, Z} × C ×W → ΩI
where W ⊆ {S , M , Tu , W , Th , F , Sa} is a set of days (strictly speaking, the paradox
involves just the interval between Tu (Tuesday) and F (Friday). The value p(g, c, d)
models how in g’s frame of existence the coin c exists at day d with strength p(g, c, d).
Definition 5.8 (Admissible coins). We now define an admissible configuration of coins any
arrangement of C such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
ad) for all day d and coin c, we have∑
u:{X,Y,Z}
p(u, c, d) = (>, 1)
where we denote as “sum” the logical conjunction in ΩI : this means that day by day,
the global existence of the group of coins constantly attains the maximum; it is the local
existence that lowers when the initial conglomerate of coins is partitioned.
ad) Moreover, 
∑
cX :CX
p(X, cX , V ) = (>, 1)∑
cY :CY
p(Y, cY , G) = (>, 1)∑
cZ :CZ
p(Z, cZ , V ) = (>, 1)
In an admissible configuration the subsets CX , CY , CZ can only attain an existence p(g, c, d) 
(>, 1); that is to say, no coin completely exists locally. But for an hypothetical external observer,
capable of observing the system, adding up the forces with which the various parts of C exist,
the coins globally exist “ in some secret way, of understanding forbidden to men” (or rather, to
X,Y, Z).
Remark 5.9. An important claim is now in order, as our construction might appear just a
sleight of hand leaving open the main problem posed by the coin riddle: where do the coins
exist? Not to mention that to some extent, every theory of existence posits that things are there
in some secret way. Tlo¨n’s idealist might deny time (our model makes no strong assumption on
what time is made of: discrete, continuous, homogeneous, slowed by traveling at high speed. . . );
B⊥ ontologists live comfortably in B⊥, as defined in Remark 5.5 without being able to tell
anything about how objects “completely do not exist”. At the opposite side of the spectrum the
pure empiricist lives in B>, and they’re unable to tell how they “completely exist”).
This is where our analysis comes in handy; in particular, this is where our particular choice
of ΩI plays its roˆle. In our model B⊥, B> are just particular slices of a single object where they
coexist as particular fibers; the approach that looks at them as such is inherently better, as it
yields a quantitative answer framing both B>- and B⊥-ontology as opposite sides of a spectrum
made out of diverse colours.
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1/5
p(Y, cY ) = (>, 1)
1/4
,
Figure 1. A pictorial representation of the truth forces of coins in different
days; we choose a minimally complex, piece-wise linear model where strength
of existence goes up and down linearly to join the points where [Bor99b] gives
complete information about the coins’ configuration. X is marked in red, Z in
yellow, Y in blue. Time is considered as a continuum line, marked at weekdays
for readability.
Example 5.10. An example of an admissible configuration of coins is the following (cf. Fig-
ure 1): we assume strength of existence goes up and down linearly to join the points where
we have information about total existence of the subsets CX , CY , CZ : in the remaining in-
stants of time, the coins out of sight for X share an equal amount of existence in such a way
that constraints ad and ad above are satisfied: in this particular example, p(Y, cY , Th ) =
(>, 1), whereas p(X,CX , Th ) = p(Z,CZ , Th ) = (>, 1/5), and p(Y, cY , F ) = (>, 1/4), whereas
p(X,CX , F ) = p(Z,CZ , F ) = (>, 1).
Remark 5.11 (Continuity for a proposition). Let p : U → ΩI be a proposition; here we
investigate what does it mean for p to be (globally) continuous with respect to the Euclidean
topology on I = [0, 1], in the assumption that its domain of definition U is metrisable (this is
true for example when U is a subset of space-time). The condition is that
∀ > 0, ∃δ > 0 : |x− y| < δ ⇒ |px− py| < 
In layman terms: p is continuous on its domain of definition if its strength over nearby events
can’t change dramatically.
All elementary topology results apply to such a proposition: for example, the set of forces
with which p is true or false is a connected subset of ΩI , compact if U was compact.
Continuity and discontinuity of a proposition p : U → ΩI now capture quite well other pieces
of Borges’ literary universe: here we provide two examples. We refrain from a deep, quantitative
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analysis, and we invite the reader to fill the details of our reasoning as a pleasant re-reading
exercise of [Bor99a] and [Bor99b].18
Example 5.12 (Discontinuity, sapphire from Taprobana). Propositions p : U → Ω[0,1] that
are allowed to be discontinuous in its variables depend unpredictably from their context: such
propositions model seemingly chaotic events triggered as the end terms of a chain of disconnected
prior events; in fact, if we assume a real base for the domain of p, its continuity as stated
in Remark 5.11 roughly means that events in the same neighbourhood –“near” in space or
temporally contiguous– can’t have too much different truth/strength values.
A model for such a universe, where “terrible consequences” sometimes follow from the “im-
personal drawings, whose purpose is unclear” characterising the Company’s actions: seemingly
disconnected (that “a sapphire from Taprobana be thrown into the waters of the Euphrates”;
that “a bird be released from the top of a certain tower”; that “every hundred years a grain
of sand be added to (or taken from) the countless grains of sand on a certain beach”), but
generating nontrivial dynamics when inserted in a suitable sequence as in Figure 2.
Let us consider the dynamical system (∇ ◦ p, [0, 1]) obtained from the iterates of the compo-
sition ∇ ◦ p : [0, 1] → [0, 1] (∇ : I q I → I is the fold map of I, obtained from the identity of
I and the universal property of the coproduct). We start from a proposition p depending on a
free variable t : I; then, p(t) = (u(t), ) : ΩI consists of a strength and a truth value; but p can
be evaluated on u(t) (although this is not its universal property, the fold map ∇ just forgets
the truth value, keeping the force): the process can thus be iterated as follows, exploiting the
universal property of the natural number object in Set/I:
∇◦p7→ ∇◦p7→ ∇◦p7→ ∇◦p7→
Figure 2. A dynamical system induced by the Company’s infinite, impersonal
drawings.
It is clear that the limit behaviour of such a sequence strongly depends on the analytic properties
of f (cf. [Str96] for an intro to one-dimensional dynamic systems and for their applications see
[Wig03]). In a well-known procedure, a repeated series of drawings can chaotically deform the
configuration space on which p is evaluated.19
Another compelling example is that of the monotonicity of a proposition depending, say, on
a certain number of observers who acknowledge the “existence” of an object R (be it physical or
conceptual) in large numbers, from which very reason the existence of R gains strength.
18The plot of [Bor99a] in a nutshell is: in Babylon, a lottery game infiltrates reality to the point that it ends
up governing the actions of all men; freeing them from free will while coorting them into pawns of an infinite,
inescapable, unknowable game, governed by an iron, seemingly chaotic, probabilistic logic.
19There is of course countless termination conditions on such process p; the series can be periodic, it can stop
when p reaches maximum or minimum force, or a prescribed value, or is inside/outside a certain range of forces. . . ;
we leave such speculations to the mystagogues of the Company, or to the lions of Qaphqa.
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Example 5.13 (Continuity: a few birds, a horse). Let us consider objects whose existence
strength depends monotonously and continuously from their parameters: for example a propo-
sition p may be “truer” the more people observe it, because
things became duplicated in Tlo¨n; they also tend to become effaced and lose
their details when they are forgotten. A classic example is the doorway which
survived so long it was visited by a beggar and disappeared at his death. At
times some birds, a horse, have saved the ruins of an amphitheater. [Bor99b]
In such a situation, we can note that the strength of existence of some ruins –modeled as it
is the more naive to do, like a rigid body R in space– depends on the number of its observers:
p(R,n) =
(>, 1− 1n)
Figure 3. On Tlo¨n, there are things that exist stronger the more you believe in
them. This is a consequence of the strength p( ) monotonically depending on
an increasing variable n (“trust” in that existence, “belief” that the impossible
tribar exists.)
A last, somewhat dramatic example. What happens if we change topology on I? For example,
we could brutally forget the Euclidean topology of the closed interval [0, 1], and regard I as the
disjoint union {{t} | t : [0, 1]} of its points; so, the subobject classifier becomes the disjoint
union of [0, 1] copies of {⊥,>}. (See Figure 4 below for a picture.)
Example 5.14 (Burning fields at the horizon). The main tenet of the present paragraph is
that Berkeley idealism of infinite and disconnected instants of time finds a natural home in our
framework if the classifier is chosen to be the object ΩI =
∐
t:[0,1]{⊥,>}. Such a peculiar logical
framework allows for language to be reshaped in light of Berkeleyan instantaneism: the various
terms of the perceptual bundle are recorded and stockpiled by instantaneous accretion, by
disjoint sum of their constituents. This is exactly what happens on Tlo¨n for words like “round
airy-light on dark” or “pale-orange-of-the-sky”; objects are determined by their simultaneity,
instead of their logical dependence: accretion superimposes fictitious meaning on a temporal
sequence; it is just an illusion, a mistake of perception tricked into an illicit interpolation.
Spinoza ascribes to his inexhaustible divinity the attributes of extension and
thought; no one in Tlo¨n would understand the juxtaposition of the first (which is
typical only of certain states) and the second - which is a perfect synonym of the
cosmos. In other words, they do not conceive that the spatial persists in time.
The perception of a cloud of smoke on the horizon and then of the burning field
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and then of the half-extinguished cigarette that produced the blaze is considered
an example of association of ideas. [Bor99b]
Figure 4. Time as an infinite, and infinitely subdivided, sequence of distin-
guished instants: the “Berkeley paradox” of non existence of causality lives in a
certain topos, as nearby slices Et, Es for small |s− t| give no predictive power
on how (and if) the transition from Et to Es might happen.
Instantaneism is, of course, way larger a topic to cover than a paragraph could do. However,
we attempt to scratch the surface of this fascinating topic in our subsection 6.1 below, where we
sketch a possible “rebuttal to the idealist”: it is entirely possible the world is affected in some
way by me closing my eyes: thus, Berkeley has a fragment of a point. Yet, it takes more than
that to make it disappear; thus, Berkeley is obviously wrong.
As always, Truth lies in the middle (of a continuous interval): observation –or lack thereof–
affects beings (more: it affects Being) so that something changes in the assertion p that “Every-
thing exists” with my eyes open, and with my eyes closed.
This difference shall be regarded as an infinitesimal dent on p’s strength of truth, so to let
Berkeleyan idealism gain a little ground. Yet, it is improper to say that the world “vanished”.
It didn’t for the rest of you.
The best we can say is that p probably depends –monotonically– on the number of open eyes.
After all, objects on Tlo¨n double, triple, they are cyclically reborn; they vanish as the doorway
which survived “so long it was visited by a beggar and disappeared at his death”.
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6. Vistas on ontologies
¿No basta un solo te´rmino repetido para desbaratar y
confundir la serie del tiempo? ¿Los fervorosos que se
entregan a una l´ınea de Shakespeare no son, literalmente,
Shakespeare?
[Bor53]
Looking at our section 5 it’s noticeable how mathematically consistent Borges’ universe be-
comes when described using category theory. As we already said, this has to be regarded as
an experiment, a literary divertissement, and a test-bench for our main claim, that as abstract
as it may seem, ontology can be made quantitative. But there’s more, in the choice to analyse
Borges’ literary work: we can go further. We have this goal in mind here, while sketching some
long term goals our work can aspire to become. We begin with a more academic discussion of
classical idealism a` la Berkeley; in light of our Example 5.14, this can still be linked to Tlo¨n’s
universe, as Borges has often been fascinated by, and mocked, classical idealism (see [Bor53]).
Let’s say clearly that endeavouring on such a wide ground as classical idealism isn’t the purpose
of our work; yet, in his novel, Borges regards Tlo¨n’s language and philosophy as a concrete
realisation of Berkeley’s theory of knowledge. We thus find natural to explore such link with a
classical piece of philosophy, as far as it can be taken.
In the following subsections, we sketch a more wide-ranging plan; surely a less substantiated
one, and yet aimed at laying a foundation for future work, ours or others’, in a research track
that we feel is fertile and promising.
6.1. Answers to the idealist. Let us reconsider Example 5.6; we have already mentioned
Berkeley’s famous view of experience as a perceptual bundle of stimuli that are incapable to
cohere.
In whatever sense it accepts that there are nine coins, Berkeleyan instantaneism right af-
ter asks to cut every existence p(g, c, d) < (>, 1) at the “purely false” value, so that our no-
tion of admissibility for a configuration of coins becomes untenable, because we can’t have
∀c.∀d.∑u p(u, c, d) = (>, 1). Only what exists completely deserves to be called being. On
thiouour side of the barricade, however, we find instantaneism untenable: what exists com-
pletely (what exists completely)? Idealism is equally untenable, when the word is intended as
“the belief that what lacks a percipient conscience must suddenly disappear in thin air” (and
thus, to ensure the world to exist, there must be God).
However, as strange and counterintuitive as it may seem, instantaneism and idealism have
their point on Tlo¨n:20 we should then be able to find a tenable justification for both of them,
possibly from within topos theory; possibly, “making no pact with the impostor Jesus Christ”
(cf. [Bor99b]).
As we have seen throughout the entire work, in the internal language of a topos a proposition
p takes its truth values in a much wider range of possibilities than a mere yes-no, all-nothing
20Somehow, [Bor99b] isn’t far from an artificial world built to mock idealism; cf. also [Bor97] and the famous
essay [Bor53] therein.
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dualism; thus, existence gives way to a more nuanced notion that can be (in)valid with a certain
strength t : I. The language we introduced so far was precisely meant to quantify this stray
from classical logic. Here, itis meant to quantify how much Berkeley’s “cut” above is a blunt
one, easily falsifiable (to say the least) even on Tlo¨n.
To put it shortly, instantaneism arises forgetting the topology and order on I (cf. Remark 5.2),
and idealism arises from quotienting one of the copy I × {>} of I × {>,⊥} to a point (cf.
Remark 5.3). The problem is thus phrased in a way that makes its solution completely natural:
just don’t be a XVIIIth century Irish empiricist; if a subobject classifier carries additional
structure, don’t forget it.
Let us consider a simple proposition p, like “the World is there”: let us assume that p : U → ΩI
depends on a certain number of variables ~x; now, when saying that closing their eyes the world
disappears, David and George claim that p(Y, ) 6= p(X, ), and even more, that p(X, ) =
(⊥, 1). A certain number of implicit assumptions are already made here: first, that p’s domain
of definition splits into a product E × U ′, where E = {Y,X} is a space of parameters taking
into account the state of George and David’s eyes, so that p is evaluated on pairs (e, ~y). Second,
that every force p(X, ~y) < (>, 1) collapses to the minimum value “completelyy false” so that at
any (X, ~y) configuration the World is not there.
A more mathematically-inspired analysis of the situation is of course possible: formally,
George and David collapsed a certain subset of the classifier ΩI to a point, by means of a
quotient map Q
{⊥,>}
0 1
0 1
Q−→
{⊥,>}
0 1
(An even more blunt choice would have been to take just the fiber {⊥,>} ∼= {⊥,>}×{1}, thus
falling into classical logic; but we have no information about how George and David handle
falsehood.)
Now, what happens at p(Y, ~y), as opposed to what happens at p(X, ~y)? Strictly speaking,
we can’t rule out the possibility that perception is affected by observers (it certainly is on Tlo¨n,
in Babylon, or in a quantum mechanics laboratory); so, George and David closing their eyes
somehow affects the degree of existence of the World. In what way? In classical logic, this degree
of existence is trivially binary; but in the right topos E there can be even a continuous spectrum
of different choices. So, the apparent paradox of idealism can be turned into a safe statement:
observation –or lack thereof– affects beings so that something changes between p(Y, ) and
p(X, ). It does so in a complicated, perhaps even a mysterious way; but in a coherent fashion.
Yet, it is improper to say that the world vanished, so we can safely assume that this dent
is so infinitesimal that it goes undetected by our instruments. (Yet, what kind of instrument
detects “existence” as a pure concept?)
Of course, the practice of rewording identity and persistence-in-time as mathematical notions
affects natural language as well. When David and George close their eyes, they are tricked into
believing that the World had disappeared. But this loss of information is merely induced by
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the blunt quotient they performed on elements of U in Z> (cf. the notation in Remark 5.5);
on the contrary, whenever David and George admit that there is a continuous parameter (a
“strength”) modelling p’s truth in the sense defined here they implicitly accept to move towards
a nonclassical universe of discourse (a topos). The rest is mere calculation.
From inside Tlo¨n, this gives way to the epistemic vision of its inhabitants, where each of
X,Y, Z does not know what happens to the coins of the other observers, and in what secret way
C exists as a global entity: without an awakening about the shape of their formal logic, the
topos-theoretic model is unusable by Tlo¨nians.
Even this superficial analysis is already sufficient to make our point, that George and David
peculiar theory of existence isn’t barred from our model; on the contrary, it arises as a very
specific example of internal logic. How this is done, follows from a standard procedure in
problem-solving:
• First, identify the constraints forcing your choice of I (“what logic shapes your I?” and
vice versa “what I best approximates the logic you want to describe?”);
• Given an explicit description of ΩI , compute proposition strength (“where are you seek-
ing p to be true/false”, and at which strength?)
Points of evaluation can be provided by a temporal, spatial or any other kind of reference
whatsoever: we are completely agnostic towards the shape of space-time, towards the structure
or the properties of the set it forms; moreover, every configuration respecting the prescribed
constraints is “correct” from within the topos. Finally, our approach is computational: given
the initial piece of data (for the nine coins: the observer, a subset of coins, a day of the week)
all else necessarily follows from a calculation.21
We believe this intuitive approach to fuzzy logic through category theory has great potential
for philosophical debate, as it fits George and David’s counterintuitive perspective into a coherent
frame, and it avoids the barren dichotomies in which the debate had stalled for a few centuries.
6.2. Ye shall know them by their fruit. The main point of our paper can be summarised
very concisely: an “ontology” is a category O, inside which “Being unravels”. Every existence
theory shall be reported, and is relative, to a fixed ontology O, the “world we live in”; such
existence theory coincides with the internal language L(O) of the ontology/category (from now
on we employ the two terms as synonyms), in the syntax-semantics adjunction of [nLa20b].
So determined, the internal language of an ontology O is the collection of “things that can be
said” about the elements of the ontology.
If, now, ontology is the study of Being, and if we are structuralist in the metatheory (cf.
section 1), we cannot know beings but through their attributes. Secretly, this is Yoneda lemma
(cf. [Bor94a, 1.3.3]), the statement that the totality of modes of understanding a “thing” X
coincides with the totality of modes your language allows you to probe X. Things do not exist
out of an ontology; objects do not exist out of a category; types do not exist out of a type theory.
21Another source of agnosticism towards the structure of I was anticipated in subsection 2.4, and consists in the
refusal to adopt a temporal logic framework; we can sometimes interpret the elements of I as time instants, but
this is not an obligation at all. A presentist, or a Borges’ coherent idealist (capable to deduce from idealism the
nonexistence of time, as in [Bor53]) can establish the truth of p without renouncing their ontological stance; they
are just forced to accept the result of a calculation.
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In relational structures, objects are known via their modes of interaction with other objects,
and these are modelled as morphisms U → X; Yoneda lemma posits that we shall “know objects
by their morphisms”: the object X : C coincides with the totality of all morphisms U → X,
organised in a coherent bundle (a functor C( , X) : C → Set).
All in all, an ontology is a mode of understanding the attributes of Being: a category, be it
in an Aristotelic or in a structuralist sense. As a consequence metaontology, i.e. the totality of
such ways of understanding, must coincide with the general theory of such individual modes:
with category theory.
We should say no more on the matter: everything else pertains to metaontology.
Indeed, questions as “where is language” and what general principles inspire it might have
an anthropological or even neurophysiological answer; not an ontological one. Or at least, not
without paying a price: operative ontology as sketched here has limits. It can’t speak of Being
out of the one ignited by itself. (read as category theory has limits: it cannot speak efficiently
of objects out of a fixed universe of discourse. Implicit: category theory also has merits.)
6.3. Metaontology. The gist of our Example 5.6 is that X,Y, Z can’t assess the existence
of the coins classically; they just have access to partial information allowing neither a global
statement of existence on the set C of coins lost by X, nor an unbiased claim about the meaning
thereof. Coins are untouched as a global lost conglomerate, yet their strength of existence is
very likely to change locally.
This begs the important questions of to which extent language determines ontology. And to
which extent it constrains its expressive power? To which extent the inhabitants of Tlo¨n fail to
see what is exactly “a topos further” (persistence of existence through time). To what extent we
fail to see that. . .
Far from claiming we resolved such metaontological issues, here we make a hopefully clarifying
statement: according to Quine and his school, ontology can be defined as the “domain over
which [logical, or natural language’s] quantifiers run”. This is not wrong; in fact, it is perfectly
compatible with our views. But we work at a raised complexity level, in the following sense. In
our framework, ontology a` la Quine still is a category, because (cf. Definition 4.2) a quantifier
can be described as a certain specific kind of functor
∀,∃ : PX → PY
between powersets regarded as internal categories of our ambient ontology O; in light of this, it’s
easy to imagine this pattern to continue: if Quine calls metaontology what we call ontology, i.e.
the metacategory grounding his propositional calculus is a single ambient category among many,
we live “one universe higher” in the cumulative hierarchy of foundations and meta-foundations:
our ontology possesses a higher dimensionality, and harbours Quinean theory as an internal
structure (see Definition A.15 for the definition of an internal category). So, it shall exist,
somewhere -at least in some secret way, hidden from the comprehension of men- a language that
calls ontology what we call metaontology (and thus a language that declassifies Quine’s to a
sub-ontology -whatever this means).
Finding the bottom of this tower of turtles is the aim of the track of research, of very ancient
tradition, within which we want to insert the present work.
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Of course our work does not make a single comment on how, if, and when, this ambitious
foundational goal can be achieved. We just find remarkable that framing Quine’s definition
in this bigger picture is not far from the so-called practice of “negative thinking” in category
theory: negative thinking is the belief that a high-dimensional/complex entity can be understood
through the analogy with its low-dimensional/complexity counterparts; see [nLa17, nLa11] for
a minimal introduction to the principle, [BS10] for a practical introduction, and see [Gow07] for
what Gowers calls “backwards generalisation”.
6.4. Conclusion. The circle closes on, and motivates better, our initial foundational choice:
categories and their theory correspond 1:1 to ontology and its theory. However, countless im-
portant issues remain open: in what sense this is satisfying? In what sense the scope of our
analysis is not limited by this choice? What’s his foundation? Is this a faithful way to describe
such an elusive concept as “Being”?
None of these questions is naive; in fact, each legitimately pertains to metaontology and has
no definitive answer. More or less our stance is as follows: approaching problems in ontology
with a reasonable amount of mathematical knowledge is fruitful. Yet, the problem of what is a
foundation for that mathematics remains (fortunately!) wide open; it pertains to metaontology,
whose ambitious effort is to clarify “what there is”. We believe the philosophers’ job to work in
synergy with quantitative knowledge, approaching the issue with complementary tools.
Appendix A. Category theory
El atanor esta´ apagado -repitio´- y esta´n llenos de polvo los
alambiques. En este tramo de mi larga jornada uso de otros
instrumentos.
[Bor75]
A.1. Fundamentals of CT. Throughout the paper we employ standard basic category-theoretic
terminology, and thus we refrain from giving a self contained exposition of elementary defini-
tions. Instead, we rely on famous and wide-spread sources like [Bor94a, Bor94b, ML98, Rie17,
Lei14, Sim11].
Precise references for the basic definitions can be found
• for the definition of category, functor, and natural transformation, in [Bor94a, 1.2.1],
[ML98, I.2], [Bor94a, 1.2.2], [ML98, I.3], [Bor94a, 1.3.1].
• The Yoneda lemma is stated as [Bor94a, 1.3.3], [ML98, III.2].
• For the definition of co/limit and adjunction, in [Bor94a, 2.6.2], [ML98, III.3], [Bor94a,
2.6.6], [ML98, III.4] (consider in particular the definitions of pullback, product, terminal
object).
• For the definition of accessible and locally presentable category in [Bor94b, 5.3.1],
[Bor94b, 5.2.1], [AR94].
• Basic facts about ordinal and cardinal numbers can be found in [Kun83]; another com-
prehensive reference on basic and non-basic set theory is [Jec13].
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• The standard source for Lawvere functorial semantics is Lawvere’s PhD thesis [Law63];
more modern accounts are [HP07].
• Standard references for topos theory are [MLM92, Joh77]. See in particular [MLM92,
VI.5] and [Joh77, 5.4] for what concerns the Mitchell-Be´nabou language of a topos.
A.2. Toposes. For us, an ordinal number will be an isomorphism class of well-ordered sets, and
a cardinal number is any ordinal which is not in bijection with a smaller ordinal. Every set X
admits a unique cardinality, i.e. a least ordinal κ with a bijection κ ∼= X such that there are no
bijections from a smaller ordinal. We freely employ results that depend on the axiom of choice
when needed. A cardinal κ is regular if no set of cardinality κ is the union of fewer than κ sets
of cardinality less than κ; all cardinals in the following subsection are assumed regular without
further mention.
Let κ be a cardinal; we say that a category A is κ-filtered if for every category J ∈ Cat<κ
with less than κ objects, A is injective with respect to the cone completion J → JB; this means
that every diagram
J

D // A
JB
D¯
>>
has a dotted filler D¯ : JB → A.
We say that a category C admits filtered colimits if for every filtered category A and every
diagram D : A → C, the colimit colimD exists as an object of C. Of course, whenever an
ordinal α is regarded as a category, it is a filtered category, so a category that admits all
κ-filtered colimits admits all colimits of chains
C0 → C1 → · · · → Cα → · · ·
with less than κ terms. A useful, completely elementary result is that the existence of colimits
over all ordinals less than κ implies the existence of κ-filtered colimits; this relies on the fact
that every filtered category A admits a cofinal functor (see [Bor94a]) from an ordinal αA.
We say that a functor F : A → B commutes with or preserves filtered colimits if whenever
J is a filtered category, D : J → A is a diagram with colimit L = colimJ Dj , then F (L) is the
colimit of the composition F ◦D. Anoter common name for such an F is a finitary functor, or
a functor with rank ω.
Definition A.1. Let C be a category;
• We say that C is κ-accessible if it admits κ-filtered colimits, and if it has a small sub-
category S ⊂ A of κ-presentable objects such that every A ∈ A is a κ-filtered colimit of
objects in S.
• We say that C is (locally) κ-presentable if it is accessible and cocomplete.
The theory of presentable and accessible categories is a cornerstone of categorical logic, i.e. of
the translation of model theory into the language of category theory.
Accessible and presentable categories admit representation theorems:
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• A category C is accessible if and only if it is equivalent to the ind-completion Indκ(S) of
a small category, i.e. to the completion of a small category S under κ-filtered colimits;
• A category C is presentable if and only if it is a full reflective subcategory of a category
of presheaves i : C → Cat(Sop,Set), such that the embedding functor i commutes with
κ-filtered colimts.
All categories of usual algebraic structures are accessible, and they are locally presentable
as soon as they are cocomplete; an example of a category which is ℵ1-presentable but not
ℵ0-presentable: the category of metric spaces and short maps.
We now glance at topos theory :
Definition A.2. An elementary topos is a category E
• which is Cartesian closed, i.e. each functor ×A has a right adjoint [A, ];
• having a subobject classifier, i.e. an object Ω ∈ E such that the functor Sub : Eop → Set
sending A into the set of isomorphism classes of monomorphisms
[
U
↓
A
]
is representable
by the object Ω.
The natural bijection E(A,Ω) ∼= Sub(A) is obtained pulling back the monomorphism U ⊆ A
along a universal arrow t : 1→ Ω, as in the diagram
U //

1
t

A
χU
// Ω
so, the bijection is induced by the map
[
U
↓
A
]
7→ χU .
Definition A.3. A Grothendieck topos is an elementary topos that, in addition, is locally
presentable.
The well-known Giraud theorem gives a proof for the difficult implication of the following
recognition principle for Grothendieck toposes:
Theorem A.4. Let E be a category; then E is a Grothendieck topos if and only if it is a left
exact reflection of a category Cat(Aop,Set) of presheaves on a small category A.
(recall that a left exact reflection of C is a reflective subcategory R ↪→ C such that the
reflector r : C → R preserves finite limits. It is a reasonably easy exercise to prove that a left
exact reflection of a Grothendieck topos is again a Grothendieck topos; Giraud proved that all
Grothendieck toposes arise this way.)
A.3. A little primer on algebraic theories. The scope of this short subsection is to collect
a reasonably self-contained account of functorial semantics. It is unrealistic to aim at such a big
target as providing a complete account of it in a single appendix; the reader is warmly invited
to parallel their study with more classical references as [Law63].
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Definition A.5 (Lawvere theory). A Lawvere theory is a category having objects the natural
numbers, and where the sum on natural numbers has the universal property of a categorical
product, as defined e.g. in [Bor94a, 2.1.4].
Let us denote [n] the typical object of L. Unwinding the definition, we deduce that in
a Lawvere theory L the sum of natural numbers [n + m] is equipped with two morphisms
[n]← [n+m]→ [m] exhibiting the universal property of the product.
Every Lawvere theory comes equipped with a functor p : Finop → C that is the identity on
objects and preserves finite products. A convenient shorthand to refer to the Lawvere theory L
is thus as the functor p, or as the pair (p,L).
Definition A.6. The category Law of Lawvere theories has objects the Lawvere theories, un-
derstood as functors p : Finop → L, and morphisms the functors h : p → q such that the
triangle
Finop
q
""
p
||L
h
//M
is commutative. It is evident that Law is the subcategory of the undercategory Finop/Cat (see
e.g. [ML98, I.6]for a precise definition) made by those functors that preserve finite products.
Remark A.7. The category Law has no nonidentity 2-cells; this is a consequence of the fact
that a natural transformation α : h ⇒ k that makes the triangle “commute”, i.e. α ∗ p = idq
must be the identity on all objects.
Example A.8 (The trivial theories). The category Finop, opposite to the category of finite
sets and functions, is the initial object in the category Law; the terminal object is constructed
as follows: the category T has objects the natural numbers, and T ([n], [m]) = {∗} for every
n,m : N. It is evident that given this definition, there is a unique identity-on-objects functor
L → T for every other Lawvere theory (p,L).
Definition A.9 (Model of a Lawvere theory). A model for a Lawvere theory (p,L) consists
of a product-preserving functor L : L → Set. The subcategory [L,Set]× ⊂ [L,Set] of models
of the theory L is full, i.e. a morphism of models L → L′ consists of a natural transformation
α : L⇒ L′ between the two functors.
Observe that the mere request that α : L→ L′ is a natural transformation between product
preserving functors means that α[n] : L[n]→ L′[n] coincides with the product (α[1])n : L[1]n →
L′[1]n.
Proposition A.10. Let p : Finop → L be a Lawvere theory. Then, the following conditions are
equivalent for a functor L : L → Set:
• L is a model for the Lawvere theory (p,L);
• the composition L ◦ p : Finop → Set preserves finite products;
• there exists a set A such that L ◦ p = Set(j[n], A).
CATEGORICAL ONTOLOGY I 43
Corollary A.11. The square
Mod(p,L)
u

r // [L,Set]
p∗

Set
Nj
// [Finop,Set]
is a pullback of categories. The functor u is completely determined by the fact that u(L) = L[1],
r is an inclusion, and Nj(A) = λF.Set(F,A) is the functor induced by the inclusion j : Fin ⊂ Set.
Corollary A.12. The category of modelsMod(p,L) of a Lawvere theory is a locally presentable,
accessibly embedded, complete and cocomplete subcategory of [L,Set]. Moreover, the forgetful
functor u : Mod(p,L) → Set of Corollary A.11 is monadic in the sense of [Bor94b, 4.4.1]. A
complete proof of all these facts is in [Bor94b, 3.4.5], [Bor94b, 3.9.1], [Bor94b, 5.2.2.a]. A
terse argument goes as follows: the functors p∗, Nj are accessible right adjoints between locally
presentable categories; therefore, so is the pullback diagram: r is a fully faithful, accessible right
adjoint, and u is an accessible right adjoint, that moreover reflects isomorphisms. It can be
directly proved that it preserves the colimits of split coequalizers, and thus the adjunction f a u
is monadic by [Bor94b, 4.4.4].
The last technical remark that we collect sheds a light on the discorso prolisso in section 2:
the models of a thelory L interpreted in the category of models of a theory M correspond to
the models of a theory L ⊗M, defined by a suitable universal property:
Mod(L ⊗M,Set) ∼= Mod(L,Mod(M,Set)) ∼= Mod(M,Mod(L,Set)).
Definition A.13. Given two theories L andM it is possible to construct a new theory called
the tensor product L ⊗ M; this new theory can be characterized by the following universal
property: the models of L⊗M consist of the category of L-models interpreted in the category
ofM-models or, equivalently (and this is remarkable) ofM-models interpreted in the category
of L-models.
Theorem A.14. ([Bor94b, 4.6.2]) There is an equivalence between the following two categories:
• Law, regarded as a non-full subcategory of the category Finop/Cat, i.e. where a morphism
of Lawvere theories consists of a functor h : L →M that preserves finite products;
• finitary monads, i.e. those monads that preserve filtered colimits, and morphisms of
monads in the sense of [Bor94b, 4.5.8].
Proof. The proof goes as follows: given a Lawvere theory p : Finop → L, we have shown
that the functor u : Mod(p) → Set in the pullback square Corollary A.11 has a left adjoint
f : Set → Mod(p); the composition uf is thus a monad on Set. This is functorial, when a
morphism of monads is defined 
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Definition A.15. Let C be a category with finite limits. An internal category A consists of a
pair (A0, A1) of objects of C, endowed with morphisms s, t, c, i as in the following diagram
A1 ×A0 A1 c //
p0 //
p1
// A1
s //
t
// A0i
oo
where A1 ×A0 A1 is obtained pulling back s, t. These data must satisfy the following axioms,
resembling the category axioms:
ic) i equalises the pair (s, t), i.e. s ◦ i = t ◦ i, and this composition makes the identity 1A0 ;
ic) t ◦ p1 = t ◦ c and s ◦ p0 = s ◦ c;
ic) c ◦ 〈1A1 , i ◦ s〉 = c ◦ 〈i ◦ t, 1A1〉, and this composition makes the identity 1A1 ;
ic) c is associative, i.e. c ◦ (1A1 ×A0 c) = c ◦ (c×A0 1A1).
These axioms are meant to re-enact the definition of category, as an abstract “object of
objects” and “object of morphisms”, endowed with maps s, t : A1 → A0 sending every morphism
to its source and target, with an identity selector map i : A0 → A1 and with a composition
partial binary operation c : A1×A1 → A1 whose domain is the object of composable arrows. Cf.
[Bor94a, 8] for a torough discussion. It has to be noted however that the theory of categories is
not an algebraic theory in the sense of our Definition A.5, and this just because the composition
operation is only partially defined over the domain of composable arrows, i.e. on the pullback
A1×A0A1. Theories whose syntax allows for a number of partially defined relation and function
symbol are termed essentially algebraic. See [AR94] for a torough discussion of the topic.
References
[Aga12] E. Agazzi, Ragioni e limiti del formalismo. saggi di filosofia della logica e della matem-
atica, Franco Angeli, 2012.
[AR94] J. Ada´mek and J. Rosicky´, Locally presentable and accessible categories, London Math-
ematical Society Lecture Note Series, vol. 189, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1994.
[Bai13] J. Bain, Category-theoretic structure and radical ontic structural realism, Synthese 190
(2013), no. 9, 1621–1635.
[Bla52] M. Black, The Identity of Indiscernibles, Mind 61 (1952), no. 242, 153–164.
[Bor] J.L. Borges, The sect of the Phoenix, Collected Fictions.
[Bor44] , Ficciones, Editorial Sur, Buenos Aires, 1944.
[Bor53] , Nueva refutacio´n del tiempo, Otras inquisiciones, Sur, 1953.
[Bor75] , La rosa de paracelso, El libro de arena, Emece´, 1975.
[Bor94a] F. Borceux, Handbook of categorical algebra. 1, Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its
Applications, vol. 50, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, Basic category
theory.
[Bor94b] , Handbook of categorical algebra. 2, Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Appli-
cations, vol. 51, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, Categories and struc-
tures.
[Bor97] J.L. Borges, Otras inquisiciones, Biblioteca Borges, Alianza, 1997.
CATEGORICAL ONTOLOGY I 45
[Bor99a] , The lottery in Babylon, Collected Fictions, Penguin Books, 1999.
[Bor99b] , Tlo¨n, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, Collected Fictions, Penguin Books, 1999.
[Bou50] N. Bourbaki, The architecture of mathematics, The American Mathematical Monthly
57 (1950), no. 4, 221–232.
[BS10] J.C. Baez and M. Shulman, Lectures on n-categories and cohomology, Towards higher
categories, Springer, 2010, pp. 1–68.
[Car56] R. Carnap, Meaning and necessity, enlarged edition, University of Chicago, Chicago
(1956).
[CH08] J.R.B. Cockett and P.J.W. Hofstra, Introduction to Turing categories, Annals of pure
and applied logic 156 (2008), no. 2-3, 183–209.
[CH14] , Total maps of Turing categories, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer
Science 308 (2014), 129–146.
[Che57] C.C. Chevalley, Fundamental concepts of algebra, Pure and applied mathematics, vol.7,
Academic Press Inc.,U.S., 1957.
[CL84] L. Coppey and C. Lair, Lec¸ons de the´orie des esquisses, Diagrammes 12 (1984), i–38.
[Cor96] L. Corry, Modern algebra and the rise of mathematical structures, Science Network
Historical Studies, Birkha¨user, 1996.
[DLa] D. Dentamaro and F. Loregian, Categorical ontology ii: A geometric look on identity,
in preparation.
[DLb] , Categorical ontology iii: No identity without homotopy, in preparation.
[Ehr68] C. Ehresmann, Esquisses et types des structures alge´briques..., 1968.
[Eva16] B. Eva, Category theory and physical structuralism, European Journal for Philosophy
of Science 6 (2016), no. 2, 231–246.
[FK72] P.J. Freyd and G.M. Kelly, Categories of continuous functors. I, J. Pure Appl. Algebra
2 (1972), 169–191.
[Fre79] Gottlob Frege, Posthumous writings, 1st edition ed., University of Chicago Press, 1979.
[Fre08] P.J. Freyd, Algebraic real analysis, Theory and Applications of Categories 20 (2008),
no. 10, 215–306.
[Gam91] L.T.F. Gamut, Logic, language, and meaning, volume 1: Introduction to logic, vol. 1,
University of Chicago Press, 1991.
[Gow07] T. Gowers, One way of looking at cauchy’s theorem, Gowers’ Weblog, September 2007.
[Gri07] Pierre Antoine Grillet, Abstract algebra, vol. 242, Springer Science & Business Media,
2007.
[HP07] M. Hyland and J. Power, The category theoretic understanding of universal algebra:
Lawvere theories and monads, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 172
(2007), 437–458.
[Jec13] T. Jech, Set theory, Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
[Joh77] P.T. Johnstone, Topos theory, LMS Mathematical Monographs, no. 10, Academic
Press, London, 1977.
[JPT04] G. Janelidze, B. Pareigis, andW. Tholen, Galois theory, Hopf algebras, and semiabelian
categories, Fields Institute Communications, vol. 43, American Mathematical Society,
Providence, RI, 2004, Papers from the Workshop on Categorical Structures.
46 DARIO DENTAMARO AND FOSCO LOREGIAN
[JR97] Bart Jacobs and Jan Rutten, A tutorial on (co) algebras and (co) induction, Bulletin-
European Association for Theoretical Computer Science 62 (1997), 222–259.
[Kro¨07] R. Kro¨mer, Tool and object: a history and philosophy of category theory, 2007 ed.,
Science networks historical studies 32, Birkha¨user, 2007.
[Kun83] K. Kunen, Set theory. an introduction to independence proofs, 1 ed., Studies in Logic
and the Foundations of Mathematics 102, North Holland, 1983.
[Law63] F.W. Lawvere, Functorial semantics of algebraic theories, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 50 (1963), no. 5, 869.
[Law66] , The category of categories as a foundation for mathematics, Proceedings of the
Conference on Categorical Algebra (Berlin, Heidelberg) (S. Eilenberg, D. K. Harrison,
S. MacLane, and H. Ro¨hrl, eds.), Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1966, pp. 1–20.
[Law96] , Unity and identity of opposites in calculus and physics, Applied categorical
structures 4 (1996), no. 2-3, 167–174.
[Lei04] T. Leinster, Higher operads, higher categories, London Mathematical Society Lecture
Note Series, vol. 298, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
[Lei14] , Basic category theory, vol. 143, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
[Lol77] G. Lolli, Categorie, universi e principi di riflessione, Boringhieri, 1977.
[LS88] J. Lambek and P.J. Scott, Introduction to higher-order categorical logic, Cambridge
Studies in Advanced Mathematics, Cambridge University Press, 1988.
[Man12] Ernest G Manes, Algebraic theories, vol. 26, Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
[Mar97] J.-P. Marquis, Category theory and structuralism in mathematics: Syntactical consid-
erations, pp. 123–136, Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, 1997.
[ML98] S. Mac Lane, Categories for the working mathematician, second ed., Graduate Texts
in Mathematics, vol. 5, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1998.
[MLM92] S. Mac Lane and I. Moerdijk, Sheaves in geometry and logic: A first introduction to
topos theory, Springer, 1992.
[Mos09] Y.N. Moschovakis, Descriptive set theory, no. 155, American Mathematical Soc., 2009.
[nLa11] nLab authors, Negative thinking, March 2011, revision 9.
[nLa17] , Category theory vs order theory, March 2017, revision 12.
[nLa20a] , Free topos, April 2020, Revision 14.
[nLa20b] , Syntax-Semantics duality, April 2020, Revision 11.
[PR00] Jan Paseka and Jiˇr´i Rosicky´, Quantales, pp. 245–262, Springer Netherlands, 2000.
[Qui53] W.V.O. Quine, From a logical point of view, Harvard University Press, 1953.
[RB82] N. Rescher and R. Brandom, The Review of Metaphysics 35 (1982), no. 3, 627–629.
[Rie17] E. Riehl, Category theory in context, Courier Dover Publications, 2017.
[SB81] H.P. Sankappanavar S. Burris, H. P. Sankappanavar, A course in universal algebra, 1
ed., Graduate Texts in Mathematics, Springer, 1981.
[Sim11] H. Simmons, An introduction to category theory, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[Str96] S.H Strogatz, Nonlinear dynamics and chaos.
[Wig03] S: Wiggins, Introduction to applied nonlinear dynamical systems and chaos, vol. 2,
Springer Science & Business Media, 2003.
CATEGORICAL ONTOLOGY I 47
Dario Dentamaro: Universita` degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica
Email address: dario.dentamaro@stud.unifi.it
Email address: dariodentamaro26@gmail.com
Fosco Loregian:Tallinn University of Technology,Institute of Cybernetics, Akadeemia tee
15/2,12618 Tallinn, Estonia
Email address: fosco.loregian@taltech.ee
Email address: fosco.loregian@gmail.com
